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The paper examines the determination of bank lending in the early 1990s with the 
data  on 393  savings  and  cooperative banks.  Particular attention  is  paid to  the 
respective roles of  bank capital and costs on the one hand and borrower quality on the 
other hand. The findings do not support the hypothesis of a general credit crunch 
caused by capital insufficiency. Some findings suggest, nevertheless, that regulatory 
pressures and perhaps distractions caused by restructuring may have had a negative 
effect on lending by the savings banks and some cooperative banks. In addition there 
is some evidence that weak capital contributed positively to credit growth of some 
subset of banks in 1992. This moral hazard behaviour differs, however, from that 
observed in a companion paper for the late 1980s. This time the banks resorting to 
a "gamble for resurrection" were not the weakest banks in terms of capitalization or 
credit risks, but more in the middle of  the spectrum: not so strong that they could take 
the full losses associated with non-performing assets and not so weak that regulatory 
pressures had strongly constrained additional lending to ailing customers. These 
banks were typically cooperative banks rather than savings banks as in the 1980s. On 
the other hand,  weak borrower quality - measured mainly by the share of non-
performing assets - contributed significantly to the low growth and contraction of 
bank lending in 1991  and 1992. In sum, bank capital was not a major factor in the 
contraction of lending in the early 1990s but lending was significantly reduced by 
weak borrower quality. 
Keywords: credit crunch, capital crunch, borrower quality, collateral squeeze, bank 
lending 
Tiivistelma 
Paperissa tutkitaan pankkien luotonantoa 1990-1uvun alussa 393 saastO- ja  osuuspan-
kin aineistolla. Erityisesti pyritaan selvittamaan pankin oman paaoman ja luotonotta-
jien laadun vaikutusta. Tulokset eivat tue kasitysta pankkien paaomapulan aiheutta-
masta yleisesta luottolamasta. Osin havainnot viittaavat kuitenkin siihen, etta viran-
omaissaantely ja mahdollisesti toimintojen uudelleen organisoinnin aiheuttamat on-
gelmat ovat saattaneet rajoittaa saastOpankkien ja  joidenkin osuuspankkien luotonan-
toa. Lisaksi loytyy hieman viitteita siita, etta huono paaomatilanne lisasi eraiden 
pankkien luotonantoa 1992. Tama moral hazard -kayttaytyminen poikkeaa kuitenkin 
vastaavanlaisessa analyysissa 1980-luvun lopun osalta havaitusta moral hazard -il-
3 miosta. TaIla kertaa "jaIleensyntymispeliin" turvautuneet pankit eivat olleet oman 
paaoman ja  luottoriskien suhteen huonoimpia pankkeja vaan pikemminkin "keskiva-
lin pankkeja": liian heikkoja, jotta ne olisivat voineet kirjata jarjestamattOmiin saami-
siin liittyvat tappiot taysimaarrusesti mutta tarpeeksi vahvoja jotta viranomaisten 
puuttuminen ei pystynyt rajoittamaan lisaIuotonantoa maksuvaikeuksissa oleville 
asiakkaille. TaIlaiset pankit olivat tyypillisesti osuuspankkeja, ei 1980-luvun tapaan 
saastopankkeja. Toisaalta luottoasiakaskunnan huono laatu, jota mitattiin lahinna jar-
jestamattomien luottojen osuudella, myotavaikutti merkittavasti luotonannon hitaa-
seen kasvuunja supistumiseen 1991 ja 1992.  Kaiken kaikkiaan pankkien omat varat 
eivat olleet merkittava rajoittava tekija luotoannon supistumisessa 1990-luvun alussa, 
mutta luottokohteiden huono laatu oli taIlainen rajoittava seikka. 
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5 1  Introduction 
Bank lending contracted in Finland by a quarter between the end of 1990 and the end 
of 1995. Many factors associated with the deep recession of the Finnish economy of 
this time have very likely contributed to this decline. But a preliminary aggregative 
analysis  suggests  that  one  factor  may have been  a  shift banks'  credit  supply. 
Contraction of  bank credit has been much more pronounced than contraction of  other 
types of external finance of the private sector.  Aggregate level interest margins 
applied to bank lending were on the increase in 1990 through 1993. Survey data 
indicate clear tightening of availability of credit in the private sector in the same 
period, and ancedotal evidence suggests that banks experienced difficulties in their 
refinancing in 1992 and early 1993 (Vihriala 1995a). 
Several potential reasons exist for a shift in banks' credit supply. The aggregate 
losses of  the Finnish deposit banks in 1991 through 1995 were FIM 66 billion, which 
falls exceeds the total regulatory capital of these banks at the end of 1990. This put 
pressure on the sufficiency of  bank capital with regard to both "market requirements" 
potentially imposed by unprotected creditors and "regulatory requirements" imposed 
by law. The latter constraint was in fact tightened with the introduction of the "BIS" 
type capital requirements in 1991 and their subsequent modification in the beginning 
of 1994. Even though banks in fact generally met the regulatory capital requirements 
thanks to a massive government intervention, the pressures on bank capital or net 
worth had a potential of reducing the supply of risky bank credit. A "credit crunch" 
or perhaps better "capital crunch" cannot be excluded a priori.  The wholy new 
experience of mounting losses due to non-performing assets and outright write-offs 
may also have changed bankers' attitudes towards credit risk. Bankers very likely 
became much more aware of  the existence of  credit risk in a deregulated environment 
than they had been in the mid-1980s. Given the consequences of massive credit 
losses, bankers may also have become much more risk averse. A credit crunch may 
thus have resulted also due to a smaller willingness to allocate funds to risky lending, 
independently of  banks' capital position. 
But as already noted, changes in banks' supply behaviour is only one explanation 
for the contraction of bank credit. Two obvious alternatives exist. Given the high 
level of  real rates of  interest, substantial overcapacity in many production sectors, and 
weak  short-term  income  prospects  ia.  associated  with  rapidly  increasing 
unemployment, demand for credit by both firms and households can be assumed very 
weak in the beginning of  the decade. Decline in credit may thus have been essentially 
a reflection of weak demand. 
Another factor is borrower quality or creditworthiness. The erosion of asset 
values since the peak of  the credit cycle in 1990 reduced firms' and households' net 
worth substantially. Simultaneously the high levels of real rates of interest on the 
existing stock of debt increased the debt service burden. For many firms having 
borrowed in foreign currency the depreciation of markka due to the devaluation of 
November 1991  and following the floating of the currency since September 1992 
compounded these difficulties. As a result, the creditworthniness of many potential 
borrowers declined substantially in the first years of the 1990s. 
Depending on the point of view, borrower quality can be regarded as both a 
supply phenomenon and a demand phenomenon. Lenders are likely to  consider 
weakening  of borrower quality  a  decline  in  effective  demand,  while  potential 
7 borrowers are likely to view the resulting higher prices and tighter terms as a decline 
of credit supply, see for example Akhtar (1994). ill the modern literature on financial 
Intermediation, the impact of borrowers' balance sheets on financial intermediation 
imply a deviation from the efficient situation. Projects requiring external finance 
cannot be realized in full as supply of  external funds fails to be as elastic as it would 
be in complete markets with symmetric information, see ego Bernanke (1993). Supply 
of credit may in these theories be disturbed equally by weak borrower balance sheets 
and by weak supply of intermediary credit due, say, to weak intermediary capital. 
Tirole and Holmstrom (1994) call the first type of intermediation problem "collateral 
squeeze"  to  be  separated  from  "credit  crunch"  potentially  associated  with 
intermediary behaviour. 
Even  though  conceptually  different,  changes  in  borrower  quality  and 
intermediary behaviour are likely to work simultaneously and reinforce one another. 
Thus a decline in asset values not only weakens the quality of the potential future 
borrowers but also induces credit losses which weaken lender capital and may change 
lenders' risk attitudes as noted above. Reduced supply of intermediary funds in turn 
is likely to worsen financial distress, and put pressure on asset values and thus on 
borrower quality. As a consequence, identifying the two forces separately is likely to 
be very difficult in any given historical episode. 
Nevertheless, from a policy point of view separating these two mechanisms 
would be highly desirable. If  the main issue is intermediary behaviour, regulatory 
policies and public bank support might be efficiently used to alleviate the adverse 
aggregate effects. On the other hand, if the dominant factors  are associated with 
borrower balance sheets, selective measures to bolster banks' capacity and willingess 
to lend would probably not be very effective. More important would be to improve 
borrowers' balance sheets. To the extent influencing this is feasible at all in the short 
run, the effective measures are likely to be in the realm of macroeconomic policies 
rather than selective banking policies. 
Given that there has been a massive government intervention through bank 
support,  tightening  of capital  standards,  some  selective  measures  to  alleviate 
borrowers' financial distress, and major reorientations in macroeconomic policies in 
Finland in the early 1990s, identifying the causes of the contraction of credit during 
this period could help assess the appropriateness of the adopted policy measures. On 
the other hand, given the exceptional depth of the financial crisis in Finland, the 
episode should provide a very informative test case for any theory about the role of 
financial factors in severe recessions. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relative roles of credit crunch, borrower 
quality, and pure demand factors in the contraction of bank credit in 1991 and 1992 
Finland. Although by credit crunch is meant a negative shift in the banks' credit 
supply for whatever reason other than change in the general level of interest, the 
focus is on the effect of bank capital on lending. What is being tested is thus the 
existence of a negative shift in lending due to weak bank capital - capital crunch -
rather than a negative shift in general. However, also other potential reasons for a 
credit crunch than insufficient capital are discussed in the course of the analysis. The 
paper utilizes data on 313 cooperative banks and 82 savings. 
The paper is organized as  follows. ill section two we discuss very briefly the 
basic approach of the existing credit crunch literature, the data that may be used to 
examine credit crunch in Finland, and the theoretical underpinnings of the analysis. 
ill section three the specification of  the test procedure is discussed including the exact 
8 period of analysis and choice of variables and functional forms. Section four reports 
the  empirical  results  on  the  loan  equation,  and  examines  the  behaviour  of 
subordinated debt. Conclusions of the analysis are summarized in section 5. 
2  The framework of the empirical analysis 
2.1  The approach of the credit crunch literature and its 
main shortcomings 
The potential for changes in the intermediaries' supply of credit has been recognized 
long, and some economists have argued that such shifts in credit supply - credit 
crunches - have been also quantitatively important, see ego  Wojnilower (1980). 
However, prior to the 1990s, the shocks considered had primarily to do with the 
availability of deposit funding and direct regulations applied to lending. Changes in 
bank net worth or capital regulations as underlying shocks causing changes in lending 
have been considered only in the 1990s. 
Starting with Bernanke and Lown (1991), a large number of empirical studies 
have examined the existence of a credit crunch in the United States in the period 
1989  through  1991.  Only  a  few  studies  exist  about  credit  crunches  in  other 
economies.  1 
The American literature, recently been surveyd by Passmore and Sharpe (1994) 
and Sharpe (1995), has given rather mixed results. A rather widely accepted view on 
the basis of aggregate data seems to be that bank lending indeed contracted in the 
beginning of the decade more than demand conditions and the stance of monetary 
policy would have warranted,  see Akhtar (1994), Lown and Wenninger (1994). 
However, time series analyses are fundamentally ill-suited to examine the precise 
reasons for such a "credit slowdown", as the main argument is that lending behaviour 
depends on bank and borrower characteristics. As a result, most studies have used 
data on individual intermediaries or some narrower aggregates of them (eg. different 
states  of the  U.S.).  Many of these  studies  have  discovered bank capital  as  an 
important constraining factor,  ie.  that the  issue  indeed is  "capital crunch"  (eg. 
Bernanke and Lown). Some studies have furthermore implicated capital regulation 
or rather its tightening through higher requirements or through stiffer enforcement as 
the reason for capital insufficiency (eg. Peek and Rosengren 1995a). However, the 
results tend to depend a great deal on how extensively the analyses control for other 
factors: the more explanatory variables are added the less important bank capital turns 
out to be in the regressions, see Berger and Udell (1994). 
With a couple of exceptions, the studies do not have any specific theoretical 
model as a point of departure. They are rather based loosely on the notion that bank 
capital may constrain banks' risky lending, either because unprotected bank creditors 
charge a premium on funds supplied or ration funding to weakly capitalized banks, 
1  Q'Brian and Browne (1992) include several Eurepan counties in their aggregate level analysis, 
Llevellyn and Drake (1994) examine credit slowdown in the UK, and Solttila and VihriaIa (1992) and 
Saarenheimo (1995) do so for Finland. 
9 or because regulators impose costs on the banks, which do not meet regulatory capital 
requirements. 
The basic approach of the literature is then to estimate with cross-section data 
a regression equation, where the dependent variable is growth of lending and the 
explanatory variables include a measure of  capital of  the lending institution and some 
other variables to control for other factors (mainly demand for credit). The empirical 
issue is the size of  the effect of the capital variable or variables and their statistical 
significance. A significant positive effect is interpreted as evidence of a credit crunch 
or more precisely capital crunch.2 Some studies have also investigated the reaction 
of securities holdings (eg. Hancock and Wilcox, 1994) or bank deposits (Peek and 
Rosengren, 1995b) to changes in bank capital and other factors. 
However, there are several potential problems in this methodology. An obvious 
purely empirical problem is that accounting for the factors which shift demand for 
credit may be very difficult. One cannot assume that demand conditions are the same 
for all banks, as banks differ in their geographical location and specialization. This 
problem is likely to be less severe when aggregates of banks are used as observation 
units, but in this case the data 100ses informativeness due to aggregation. But, as 
noted by Sharpe (1995), there are severe conceptual difficulties as well. 
First, the finding that better capitalized banks expand lending more (contract 
less) than weakly capitalized banks does not as such imply anything about aggregate 
credit supply. The better capitalized banks may supply all the credit that the weak 
banks fail to provide, if the loan customers have access to the credit supply of at least 
some adequately capitalized banks. Thus while time series analysis may not tell much 
about the causes of a potential shift in credit supply, cross-section analysis may not 
tell much about the aggregate significance of such shifts in the credit supply of 
individual institutions. 
Second, to the extent bank capital is  endogenous, banks that opt for a rapid 
growth (relative to other banks) also may select higher than average capital asset 
ratios as a precaution for the risks of  rapid expansion. Thus a positive cross-sectional 
relationship can be observed between bank capital and credit expansion even though 
bank capital in no way constrains credit supply. 
Third, as alluded to in the introduction, there are serious difficulties in separating 
the effects of bank capital and borrower qUality. Cross-sectional variation in bank 
capital is  to  a significant extent due  to  credit losses  (or credit loss  provisions, 
depending on the book-keeping practices), and these losses are strongly associated 
with the  creditworthiness  of the  potential  borrowers,  which are  likely  to  be  -
particularly  in  times  of financial  distress  - more  or less  the  same  firms  and 
households that form the existing borrower clientele. Thus, unless one succeeds in 
controlling for borrower quality, observing that weakly capitalized banks expand 
lending less than other banks could just indicate that the potential customer base is 
of weaker creditworthiness than borrowers on avegare even though there were no 
difference in credit supply to borrowers of constant quality. 
2 The natural approach of examining simultaneously the behaviour of prices and quantities is in the 
credit crunch studies excluded, as information about price of credit is very partial. Interest rates do not 
tell too much about the effective cost unless one can control for a number of usually missing factors, 
such as the maturity of the contract, the linkage of the rate to a reference rate, collateral etc ..  The 
analyses therefore focus without exception on quantities. 
10 Fourth, separating the role of regulatory actions from that of market pressures 
is all but straightforward. In particular, stiffer enforcement of capital requirements is 
likely to take place simultaneously with mounting creditor worries  about bank 
solvency. 
Finally, there are all the standard problems of econometric work relating to the 
specification of proxies for the theoretical concepts. In particular measuring the 
quality of lending opportunities is difficult. But also defining the appropriate capital 
concept may be problematic. 
There are basically two ways of alleviating these problems of empirical credit 
crunch studies. One is to do the utmost to compile informative data. The other one 
is to clarify the theoretical basis of the analysis, which, as  noted, usually is very 
vague. This paper aims at using both these avenues: to construct the data set to be as 
informative as possible in the Finnish circumstances, and to base the analysis on an 
explicit - albeit simple - theoretical model developed for the particular banks in the 
particular regulatory environment of interest. 
2.2  The basic selection of data 
One way to help the problems associated with cross-section analysis is to expand the 
data set to contain observations of cross-sectional unit at different points of time, ie. 
use panel data. For example, one might be able to identify the effect of capital from 
that of  borrower quality much better if  one could compare the response of lending to 
capital  in  the  potential  credit  crunch  period  to  that  in  more  favourable 
macroeconomic conditions with generally high asset values, less uncertainty etc. 
Similarly the endogeneity of capital might be incorporated into the  analysis  by 
estimating an equation for the issuance of bank capital simultaneously with a credit 
equation. Also identifying the impact of a regulatory change could be helped by such 
an expansion of data. Panel data have in fact been used in several American credit 
crunch studies, most notably by Berger and Udell (1994) but also ego Hancock and 
Wilcox (1993) and Shrieves and Dahl (1995). And unsurprisingly, the results so 
obtained tend to differ significantly from those obtained with pure cross-section data. 
Unfortunately, the Finnish circumstances limit very much the possibilites for a 
panel analysis. A major problem is the uniqueness of the experience with significant 
credit losses and depletion of bank capital. Significant materialization of credit risk 
is a wholy new phenomenon in Finland. Prior to 1991 banks typically booked very 
small credit losses. Apart from relatively stable macroeconomic conditions, this was 
presumably mainly due to tight regulation. On the one hand interest rate regulation 
encouraged the banks to use creditworthiness as the main criterion to ration credit. 
The regulation  focusing  on the  average  lending rate  also  allowed the  banks  to 
compensate for  the unreceived interest earnings on non-performings  loans  with 
higher rate on other loans. More important probably was, nevertheless, the fact that 
interest rate and foreign exchange regulation allowed the real rates of interest become 
significantly negative at times of potential financial distress: borrowers vulnerable to 
financial distress were bailed out by transferring the burden to bank depositors, which 
did not have highly yielding alternatives for their savings. 
A consequence of the small credit losses of the earlier times is that one cannot 
truly compare the response of  banks to depletion of capital in the early 1990s to that 
11 in different macroeconomic and regulatory conditions. The problem with the Finnish 
data is not simply that credit loss data are uninformative (variation in credit losses 
over time and across bank is  mainly due to  taxation),  but compilation of some 
important data has started only in the 1990s. Inparticular,.bank: level data on non-
performing (delinquent) assets exist only since the end of 1991. In addition, a couple 
other factors, discussed below, hamper using genuine panel analysis. 
But the uniqueness, or rather the exceptional depth of  the economic and financial 
crisis of  the early 1990s may also help inference. In these conditions, finding a cross-
sectional  relationship  between  bank  lending  and  bank  capital  (or  other  bank 
characteristics) could with substantial confidence be interpreted also suggesting about 
a similar aggregate relationship. Basically all major Finnish deposit banks had serious 
problems with capital adequacy in the early 1990s, so that borrowers were very 
unlikely to find major lenders with substantial slack in capital.3 Furthermore, the very 
weak profitability prospects of most firms in the early 1990s combined with high 
levels  of indebtedness  and  plummeting  asset  values  very likely  made  adverse 
selection problems exceptionally high thus tying debtors to their existing lenders 
much more closely than in normal times.4 Therefore, it would be very unlikely that 
borrowers turned down by their traditional lender would find alternative sources of 
bank credit. 
Apart from expanding data in the time dimension, another natural way of  helping 
the identification of the effects of intermediary characteristics from other factors, 
particularly those relating to the borrower quality, would be to combine data on banks 
with data on individual borrowers. However, problems of data avalability prevent 
such an exercise in the analysis of the Finnish episode. 
But even though one may be limited to use essentially cross-section data on 
financial  intermediaries,  an  appropriate  choice  of the  intermediary  units  to  be 
examined may help many of the aforementioned problems of  inference. In the Finnish 
case,  the  so-called local banks ie.  savings banks  and cooperative banks, which 
supplied over 40 per cent of the bank loans of the private sector in the beginning of 
the 1990s, have several attractive features for an examination of the existence of 
credit crunch. 
First, these banks specialize in lending to the domestic public, much more so 
than the commercial banks that also are active in the interbank market, securities 
market and - in some cases - foreign markets. Decisions related to lending are likely 
to  be  the  main  preoccupation  of  these  banks.  Consequently,  should  bank 
characteristics be important for bank lending at all, they should affect the lending 
decisions of these institutions particularly strongly. 
Second, these banks operate for the most part in well-defined geographical 
locations. Therefore data on incomes, employment, and population structure are 
3 Not only did all major banks incur sigificant losses in 1991 through 1993, but all of them utilized the 
offer by the Government to invest in preferred capital certificates up to FIM 8 billion or some 15 per 
cent the total existing regulatory capital of the banking system in 1992, even though the terms of this 
investment were considered very stiff by the banking community leading some highly capitalized small 
banks to turn down the offer. 
4 The results by Vesala (1995) suggest that competition in the bank loan market eased substantially in 
.1991 and 1992 relative to the two preceding years. A natural interpretation is that this was due to 
adverse selection problems and/or problems of bank capital as regulatory changes and changes in 
taxation, if anything, worked only to increase competition. 
12 available for the operation area of each savings and cooperative bank. These data can 
be utilized to control for conditions of loan demand faced by every observation unit 
much better than in many other studies using data on individual banks. 
Third, bank capital can be regarded as essentially exogeneous inthe short run for 
the savings banks and cooperative banks. These banks have been able to issue equity 
type of instruments only to a very limited extent, and even that only since 1991. 
Given  the  nature  of these  "basic  fund  shares"  and  "investment  shares",  these 
instruments  have  been of little interest to  investors,  and  their significance  has 
remained small. In addition, these banks have been able to issue subordinated debt 
that counts as regulatory capital up to a maximum of a quarter of the total regulatory 
capital. Provided one can incorporate the determination of subordinated debt into the 
analysis adequately, the problem of capital endogeneity discussed above should be 
greatly alleviated. 
Finally,  the  data  on  the  savings  banks  and  cooparative  banks  should  be 
statistically highly informative. These groups contain banks with highly different 
capital positions in the early 1990, some having ego capital asset ratios of the order 
of 20 per cent, some posting such ratios of the order of 2 to 4 per cent, and some 
banks loosing their capital several times over by the end of 1993. Also the number 
of observations is large, even though it declined substantially over the period of 
interest, from 488 at the end of 1990 to 344 in 1993. This allows reliable statistical 
analysis. 
These considerations lead us to use data on the savings banks and cooperative 
banks to study the existence of credit crunch. However, restructuring of the banking 
sectors in the course of the banking crisis constrains effectively the use of data after 
1992, as will be discussed in more detail below. The relevant bank level data are 
available only annually so that annual observations on the savings and cooperative 
banks over a period of two years, 1991 and 1992, form the basic data of the analysis. 
2.3  The theoretical backgroud of the analysis 
As noted, the tests of credit crunch typically are not based on any explicit theoretical 
model. One exception is the analysis by Peek and Rosengren (1995). They have a 
profit maximization model, where the bank chooses the amount of  loans L supplied 
subject to the conditions that these loans must be financed with exogenous capital K 
and deposits D, the return on loans is decreasing, the cost of deposits is increasing, 
and there is a capital requirement K  ;0:  kL. If  the capital constraint is not binding, an 
increase in capital leads to an increase in lending but by less than the full change in 
capital as capital in part substitutes for deposits which decline. However, if  the capital 
constraint binds, it also prevents issuing additional deposit liabilities. Therefore no 
substitution between capital and deposits exists and an increase in capital leads to an 
increase in deposits and loans. Thus the response of deposits changes sign while the 
response of loans only varies in degree when the capital constraint turns binding. 
Based on this observation Peek and Rosengren suggest that one should test for the 
existence of a binding capital constraint by estimating a deposit equation, where bank 
capital is  one of the explanatory variables. Finding that capital has  a significant 
positive effect on deposits would then be consistent with a capital crunch as  an 
explanation for credit slowdown. Estimation of such a deposit equation (growth 
13 betwwn the first quarter 1990 and the first quater 1991) with cross-section data on 
407 New England commercial and savings banks yields a result consistent with the 
capital crunch hypothesis. 
The extremely simple framework of Peek and Rosengren abstracts away from 
many important aspects. There are no substitution possibilities on the asset side, 
credit risk is not really modelled (a given exogenous fraction of loans is assumed to 
be booked as losses), the capital requirement is imposed as a technical constraint, 
which in no circumstances can be violated, the pricing of bank liabilities is assumed 
exogenous, etc. 
The literature seems to contain only one  other theoretical analysis directly 
connected with empirical credit crunch investigations. It  is provided by Passmore and 
Sharpe (1994). They use a somewhat richer value maximization framework to derive 
rather different comparative static results, on the basis of which the findings  of 
empirical studies can be assessed. 
Passmore and Sharpe allow safe securities B as an alternative asset (the balance 
sheet: L + B =  K + D), assume that the return on loans apart from declining in volume 
also is subject to stochastic variation and specify a capital requirement, the violation 
of which results  in non-pecuniary penalties on the (owners of the)  bank.  Bank 
deposits may be withdrawn, which causes costs to the bank as raising replacement 
funds is assumed costly. Securities on the other hand can be sold without cost, so that 
securities holdings lower the liquidity costs associated with deposit liabilities. Capital 
is assumed to be either exogenous (short run) or available at the going securities 
market rate in infinite amounts (long run). 
Specifying explicit forms for the contract loan rate (decreasing) , deposit cost 
schedule (quadratic), the distributions of the stochastic element of the loan return 
(uniform)  and  deposit  withdrawals  (triangular),  and  making  some  auxiliary 
assumptions, Passmore and Sharpe derive comparative statics for both the short run 
and long run. In the short run, an exogenous increase in bank capital leads to an 
increase in bank loans and a decline in bank deposits in all circumstances. The result 
is thus qualitatively the same as in the unconstrained case of the Peek and Rosengren 
model. Thus, would one consider the premises of the Passmore and Sharpe model 
more plausible than those of the Peek and Rosengren model, one could not base the 
capital crunch test on a deposit equation. Passmore and Sharpe also demonstate how 
the effect of an exogenous capital shock can have qualitatively different effects on 
securities holdings, depending on the usefulness of securities in lowering liquidity 
costs. This casts doubt on the analyses that are based on the notion that a negative 
response of a bank's securities holdings to an increase in capital would signal of 
capital crunch (eg. Hancock and Wilcox). 
These two explicit models found in the literature suggest that one needs to be 
careful when setting up  a test procedure for credit or capital crunch. An explicit 
model of bank behaviour clearly can help specifying a valid test. A more specific 
suggestion of the Passmore and Sharpe model is that, after all, examining directly the 
relationship between bank lending and capital or other bank characteristics might be 
the most robust way of testing for credit crunch. 
The empirical work of this paper will be based on a specific model of  bank loan 
supply, developed for the Finnish savings and cooperative banks in VihriaIa (1995b). 
It is a static model of value maximization where the bank faces a declining demand 
schedule for risky loans, based on the formulation of Dermine (1984). The model 
incorporates the main institutional features that have been relevant for the savings 
14 and cooperative banks in the recent years. In particular capital regulation and the 
liability structure (including subordinated debt) are modelled so as to resemble as 
much as possible the relevant circumstances; the balance sheet is L + B = K + D + 
S + M, where S stands for subordinated debt, and M for money market debt.  -
The capital requirement is modelled in the same spirit as  in Passmore and 
Sharpe: violating the required level of capital results in non-pecuniary penalties on 
the bank (owners). Andjust as in their model there are no true (pecuniary) bankruptcy 
costs in the sense that bankruptcy (inability to meet the contractual commitments vis-
a-vis creditors) would lower the value of the bank assets ie. what would be available 
to  the  creditors.5  Similarily,  the  model  assumes  symmetric  information.  Bank 
creditors  and  regulators  know just as  much  as  the  bank about  the  probability 
distribution of bank earnings. 
There are several differences between this model and that of Passmore and 
Sharpe. First, in our model there is an exogenous cost element associated with the 
collection of "cheap" core  deposits.  Changes  in  these exogenous costs can be 
interpreted as changes in the bank's net worth in response to changes in competition, 
technology or, say, taxation of deposits.6 The bank's net worth is thus affected not 
only by the amount of  capital there is in the bank to begin with but also by the costs 
of operation. 
Secondly, the pricing of other senior bank liabilities than core deposits (money 
market debt M) is analyzed under two regimes. The first assumes fair pricing under 
risk neutrality ie. that the creditor always receives an expected return equivalent to 
the safe rate of interest. This does not allow any part of  credit risk to be transferred 
to the holders of money market debt. The second pricing regime assumes a fixed 
increasing interest schedule of such bank liabilities. 
Third, the consequences of  capital insufficiency are allowed to vary. We analyze 
in addition to the situation of positive non-pecuniary penalties (as Passmore and 
Sharp do) also the cases where insufficient capital has no effect on bank owners and 
where capital insufficiency is in fact rewarded by perverse enforcement of capital 
regulations (ill-conceived bank support policies).The behaviour of bank lending 
under these assumptions is summarized in Table 1. 
5 Passmore and Sharpe call the expected penalty imposed on the bank owners in the case of non-
fulfilment of the capital requirement somewhat misleadingly "bankruptcy costs", even though the 
"bankruptcy event" has no effect on the value of bank assets as such. 
6  The negative of these costs could also represent the earnings from other banking business than 
lending, let us say securities trading, real estate speculation etc. Such earnings are likely to decline in 
times of weak economic activity and declining asset prices putting thus additional pressure on bank 
profitability. 
15 Table 1.  Comparative statics of lending 
Penalty  Pricing  Penalty  Required  Equity  Deposit  Amount  Demand  Borrower 
for  of non- capital  capital  rate  of  quality 
capital  deposit  ratio  deposits 
insuffi- funding 
ciency 
Positive  fair  +  +  +(-)  + 
fixed  +/- +(-)  +/- +(-)  +(-) 
Zero  fair  0  0  0  0  +(-)  + 
fixed  0  +/- +  +/- +(-)  +(-) 
Negative  fair  +  +  +(-)  +(-) 
fixed  +  +/- +/- +(-)  +(-) 
+/-: both possible depending on circumstances 
+( - ): both possible, but + more likely 
Given the central role of capital requirement,  many results depend crucially on 
whether  there  indeed  is  a  positive  expected  penalty  for  the  violation  of the 
requirement or not. If  there is, the model implies a credit crunch due to a tightening 
of  capital regulation. Both increasing the required amount of  capital and increasing 
the expected penalty for the violation of the capital requirement reduce bank lending. 
With given regulation and a positive penalty, the effect of a decline of the 
beginning-of-the-period bank capital, say due to credit losses experienced, and the 
effect of an increase in exogenous bank costs (decline in charter value), may also lead 
to a reduction in bank lending, but only in certain circumstances. More precisely, the 
begining-of-the-period capital has a positive impact on lending if the cost of the 
marginal liabilities increases steeply enough, and the exogenous costs have a negative 
impact on lending only if the pricing is fair. The difference of the effects of the two 
exogeneous components of bank net worth stems from the fact that an increase in 
bank costs unambiguously increases the likelihood that the  bank defaults on its 
money market debt and thereby lowers the expected cost of money market debt with 
a given loan portfolio, while a reduction of the beginning-of-the-period capital leads 
to a need to increase money market funding to finance a given loan portfolio implying 
that the expected marginal benefit from changing the loan stock depends on the 
slopes of the loan return schedule and the money market debt cost schedule. Thus, 
a credit crunch can emerge in this constellation if bank equity diminishes or charter 
value decreases say due to an increase in the costs of core deposits. Similarily, a 
credit crunch can also emerge as a result of a decline in core deposits. 
If  the capital requirement penalty is zero, none of the three factors- the level of 
capital requirement, capital and costs - have any effect on lending, as long as the 
bank's marginal funding is fairly priced. Bank characteristics in fact do not matter at 
all, but lending is determined solely on the basis of loan demand and the going rate 
of interest. This corresponds to the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem about the 
role of a firm's financial structure. 
But the model also predicts quite the opposite responses of  lending to capital and 
costs pricing of marginal liabilities does not respond adequately to bank risk or if 
perverse bank support policies reward capital insufficiency. 
16 Apart from the effects of  capital and costs also the standard responses to demand 
shocks and shocks to borrower quality fall out of  the model. Borrower quality is here 
equivalent to the shape of  the probability distribution of lending returns. A negative 
shift in borrower quality takes place, when the low yields become more likely at the 
expense of yields close to the contractual maximum. This type of change is also 
called increasing credit risk ie. increasing likelihood of credit losses. Negative shifts 
in borrower quality reduce lending always with fair pricing and positive capital 
insufficiency penalties, but with the most likely parameter values also in the case of 
fixed pricing and the effect can remain positive even with negative penalties. Thus, 
the model predicts in most circumstances a "collateral squeeze" if the borrower 
quality weakens.7 
The model's implication for the issuance of subordinated debt, the pricing of 
which is always assumed to be fair, is simple. If  the bank's perception is that failure 
to meet the capital requirement will result in punishment, the bank that uses money 
market funding will always issue (at least) the maximum amount of subordinated 
debt counted as regulatory capital. As this maximum is determined by the amount of 
equity capital, also the total regulatory capital is effectively exogenous. However, if 
no penalty is perceived, subordinated debt does not differ in any way from senior debt 
and no specific amount of  subordinated debt is predicted. With a negative penalty and 
fair pricing, the optimal subordinated debt is zero. Also with fixed pricing zero, some 
intermediate amount  or the maximum amount of subordnated debt may result 
depending on the shape of  the marginal cost curve and the loan demand schedule. 
Under the assumptions of  the model, the amount of subordinated debt the banks 
issue can thus be used as an independent test of  the pricing of marginal liabilities and 
the  stiffness  of  regulation.  Finding  that  the  banks  using  non-deposit  credit 
instruments have used at least the maximum amount of subordinated debt that counts 
as regulatory capital suggests of fair or sufficiently steep pricing of money market 
debt and appropriately working capital regulation. By the same token, low shares of 
subordinated debt suggest of either too low pricing of money market debt or non-
positive perceived penalties for violations of the capital requirement, or both. 
7  Thinking of the typical financial crisis situation, in which borrower quality weakens, bank capital 
is depleted by credit losses, and perhaps regulation is tighteted to contain excessive risk taking, the 
model can produce several alternative responses of lending. Although weaker borrower quality and 
tighter regulation induce cut back of lending, reduction in capital may either increase or decrease 
lending or fail to have any effect. The net result then depends on the relative strengths of these effects 
and other factors such as demand for credit. 
17 3  Specification of the test procedure 
3.1  Constraining factors 
The theory discussed above suggests estimating an equation for bank loans, and using 
the estimated effects of  bank capital and costs as a means of testing for the existence 
of a "credit crunch" due to capital or net worth problems. The companion paper 
(Vihriiila, 1996c) focusing on the effect of a potential mispricing of bank liabilities 
and the associated moral hazard on the growth of bank lending in the 1980s is based 
on  the  same theoretical  model.  It would  therefore  be  natural  to  use  the  same 
formulation also in the analysis of  the current problem, ie. conduct a uniform analysis 
of local bank credit supply since the mid-1980s. However, this is not possible. 
As was discussed above, credit risk is  a new phenomenenon in the Finnish 
banking market. Relevant data do not exist for the 1980s, and partly not even before 
the end of 1991. In addition, three factors importantly affect the period of analysis, 
the number of observations, and the choice of variables and functional forms. They 
effectively prevent a uniform analysis of  banks' loan supply in the period of the mid-
1980s through the early 1990s. 
First, the number of the banks has declined substantially over the years. The 
number of  cooperative banks declined from 338 at the end of 1990 to 303 at the end 
of 1993 due to mergers within the group. A much more radical change took place in 
the savings bank group. Mergers reduced the number of savings banks from 150 at 
the end of 1990 to 86 at the end of 1991. Furthermore, most of the larger savings 
banks merged to form  Savings Bank of Finland (SBF)  in the Autumn of 1992 
reducing the number of independent savings bank units to 41  at the end of the year 
(Figure 1). And in the Autumn of 1993 SBF was effectively dismantled through a sale 
of loans and transfer of deposits to the four competing bank groups. This not only 
eliminated an interesting bank from the data but contaminated the loan data of other 
banks.  The loans  sold from  the  SBF loan books  to  the  competing banks  were 
transferred gradually to the balance sheets of the receiving banks. In part this took 
place already in 1993, in part later. This implies that the end-of-1993 loan books of 
the cooperative banks cannot be compared with those a year before.s 
8 Also some of  the remaining savings banks were affected indirectly, as some savings bank customers 
rather trasferred their loans to another savings bank than to the designated buyer. As precice data on 
the loan transfers are not available, no useful analysis can be done with the 1993 data. 
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In order to maximize the number of  observations, the analysis is conducted for 1991 
and 1992 with the data on the cooperative banks that existed at the end of 1992, and 
for the savings banks that existed prior to the formation of  SBF. The 1992 data on the 
"SBF banks" refer as a consequence to the last filed balance sheet, income statement 
and other information  that  existed  prior to  the  merger,  in  practice  August  or 
September 1992. With regard to credit losses, an attempt was made to construct even 
data about the post-merger situation. For the other, non-SBF savings banks, the 1992 
data are for the year as a whole or the year end. To maximize the information about 
the potentially most interesting year 1992, all banks that existed in that year are 
included in the analysis ie. the observations prior to 1992 are aggregated for the banks 
that have merged. As important data were missing on some banks, the analysis is 
conducted with the observations of 313 cooperative banks and 82 savings banks of 
the years 1990-1992. 
Second, the empirical counterpart of  the exogenous core deposits has very likely 
become much smaller in coverage in the early 1990s than it was in the 1980s. The 
changes in capital income taxation have allowed banks to price competitively a large 
fraction of their deposits.  This  part of the deposit stock has  therefore become 
endogenous. Unfortunately, bank level data by types  of deposits are not readily 
available. Therefore one can neither regard all deposits or their interest costs as 
exogeneous  (as  one  could  in  the  1980s  data)  nor  explicitely  model  their 
determination, see Appendix 1. As a consequence, it is not appropriate to use deposit 
growth or the average deposit rate as explanatory variables or use the loan deposit 
ratio as the dependent credit variable as was done in the companion paper. 
Third, as will be discussed below, capital regulation was significantly modified 
in 1991 (and 1994). This makes difficult to use a uniform capital concept for a period 
extending from the mid 1980s to, say, 1992. 
19 3.2  The loan equation and the main variables 
As with most economic relationships, the theoretical model discussed above posits 
relationships between abstract concepts in a simple stylized world. To be able to 
investigate the hypotheses about credit crunch, collateral squeeze and demand factors, 
operationalizations for the theoretical concepts are needed and the functional form 
has to be specified. One also needs to control for factors that may affect the observed 
behaviour of lending  but  which  have  been  abstracted  away  in  the  theoretical 
discussion. 
The basic form of the equation for bank loans to be examined in this paper is 
ilL =a+b.CAP +c·COST +d·CGLOSS +e·NPA +f·BUSSHA 
L 
+~g  .. x. +h·CPO +k·LID +1·SIZE +m·CLOSSG +~n.·DUMMY.  +e, 
1  1  1  I 
where L refers to the loan stock, CAP is a capital adequacy variable, COST a variable 
reflecting the bank's operational costs, CGLOSSNET measures credit and guarantee 
losses and NPA non-performings assets, BUSSHA is the the share of  business loans, 
Xj'S are variables that shift demand for loans, CPO is a measure of the competitive 
situation in the local market, SIZE describes the bank's size, CLOSSG reflects gross 
credit losses, DUMMYj's are dummy variables (intercept as well as slope dummies) 
that obtain  a  non-zero value  for  savings  bank observations,  a through nj' s  are 
parameters to be estimated and e an error term. 
The  dependent  variable  is  the  rate  of growth  of bank loans  between  the 
beginning of the period and the end of the period. In the reported versions the loan 
concept is  the total loans  at the end of the year.  Three  alternative periods  are 
considered: (i) end-1990 - end-1992, (ii) end-1990 - end-1991, (iii) end-1991 - end-
1992. 
The inclusion of the capital and cost variables falls directly out of the theoretical 
model. The capital adequacy variable has several possible operationalizations. In the 
theoretical model the exogenous capital concept is the ex ante equity capital invested 
by the owner-manager. The closest empirical counterpart of such a concept might be 
core capital or the Tier-I capital of the Deposit Bank Act or Credit Institution Act. 
Core capital scaled by risk-weigted assets is denoted by CORCAP.9 CORCAP is 
rather close to the ratio of equity capital and reserves (provisions) to total assets, 
which often times is the capital concept used in empirical studies. This alternative 
was used in the companion study on the boom period. 
But also wider capital concepts may be relevant. The information banks produce 
for creditors and regulators typically emphasizes the total capital adequacy ratio 
required by the legislation ie. the ratio including in the numerator subordinated debt 
and other items which are classified as Tier-IT capital. In Finland in the early 1990s, 
bank capital adequacy was almost exclusively discussed in terms of the banks' total 
9 The capital concept is almost the same in the Depent Bank Act  and Credit Institution Act but the 
denominators differ a great deal from one another. In the analyses reported, the core capital concept 
is an estimated Tier-I capital of the Credit Institution Act. 
20 regulatory capital ratio: whether or not the banks met the 8 per cent minimum and 
how large the margins vis-a.-vis this minimum were. 
From the point of view of the buyers of senior bank debt such a wider concept 
may in fact be more relevant than the narrow core capital, even if no such role is 
given for it in the theoretical model. In the fair pricing version of the model, the 
buyers of money market debt require the same expected rate of return independently 
of how much subordinated debt the bank has. In the version with a fixed pricing 
schedule,  no  dependence  between  the  pricing  schedule  and  the  amount  of 
subordinated debt is  specified.  But in reality,  with lemons premia, the cost and 
availability of senior funds are likely depend also on the amount of  junior debt. 
Two  alternative  total  capital  adequacy  ratios  are  examined.  The  first  one 
(DBARAT) is directly the capital adequacy ratio of the Deposit Bank Act in force 1 
January 1991 through 31 December 1993.10 The second alternative, denoted BISRA  T, 
is the ratio defined in the Credit Institution Act (CIA) in force since 1 January 1994. 
The new requirement abolished the favoured treatment in risk weighting of the assets 
guaranteed by insurance companies,  and implied a  significant tightening of the 
requirement with respect to the DBA, particularly for the cooperative banks, which 
had widely used insurance company guarantees. The new ratio - denoted BISRAT 
- is fully compatible with the EU regulations and close to the recommendations of 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Banks may have considered BISRAT 
more relevant already in 1991 and 1992 for two reasons. First, the banks which were 
authorized by Bank of  Finland (BoF) to conduct foreign exchange transactions, were 
regulated also by BoF, which required the banks to report the BIS capital ratio. 
Second,  banks  may  have  already  prepared  for  the  prospective  change  in  the 
regulation, which was being discussed and prepared ever since the enactment of the 
DBA. 
The valuation and time of measurement of capital are not quite obvious either. 
The theoretical concept refers to the ex ante equity capital invested. The appropriate 
empirical counterpart were the market value of bank equity in the beginning of the 
period of interest. However, no such market value data are available. 
An alternative would be to use the ratio of some future observed capital to the 
beginning-of-the period (risk-weighted) assets. Such a measure, as used by Hancock 
and Wi1cox, would incorporate the anticipated changes in capital due to retained 
profits or losses (and anticipated issues of  equity capital). But such a procedure would 
not incorporate anticipated changes in assets, which can be equally important, as 
banks certainly are  aware of the  amortization schedules of loans and can make 
projections about the use of loan commitments (whether explicit or implicit). To 
incorporate these, one would need to use capital ratio of  some future date as such. But 
this in turn creates a potentially very serious  simultaneity bias in the estimated 
relationship. Unexpected changes in the loan stock due to delinquencies, unexpected 
use of loan commitments etc. increase loan stock while they at the same time lower 
the capital ratio: the simultaneity creates a spurious negative correlation between loan 
growth and the end-of-the-period capital ratio. To eliminate this one needs to use an 
instrumental variables approach. 
10 The act required the banks to hold the ratio at at least 8 per cent. But as many banks did not fulfil 
the requirement at the time of its enactment, a transition period through 1 January 1996 was allowed 
for such capital deficient banks. Therefore many banks had DBATATs below 8 per cent in the period 
of the analysis. 
21 Finally, in the period of interest there is a special factor that affected several 
banks'  end-of-period  capital  stock.  It  is  the  capital  injection  by  the  Finnish 
Government of FIM 8 billion in all in 1992. This measure certainly was not known 
in 1991, as it was decided upon in March 1992, and the terms of  it were defined in 
June 1992. But it may nevertheless have affected loan supply in the second half of 
1992. Furthermore, the banks that accepted the offer - 56 cooperative banks and 22 
savings banks in the data set - may have expected tighter supervision than the banks 
in which no such Government money was invested. Thus the behaviour of  such banks 
may have differed from that of others. Therefore, when using a capital dated at the 
end of 1992 one needs to deduct the Government supplied capital and examine its 
effects  separately;  the  change  in  the  appropriate  capital  concept  due  to  the 
government capital injection is denoted by GOVK. 
The cost variable COST is operationalized by the ratio of all other costs than 
interest expenses to the balance sheet total (the average of the beginning and the end 
of the year), just as in the companion paper. It is dated at the beginning of the period 
of interest. 
Three types of variables are used to depict the riskiness of bank lending. They 
all relate to the existing portfolio of the bank. It is assumed that the riskiness of a 
bank's lending  business  is  positivelty related  to  the  amount of net  credit  and 
guarantee losses incurred, CGLOSSN, the outstanding non-performing assets, NP  A, 
and the share of business loans in all loans, BUSSHA.While CGLOSSN and NPA 
can be assumed to reflect rather directly the riskiness of the bank's loan portfolio, the 
share of business loans does so only in so far business loans indeed are riskier than 
other loans. Given the much higher default rates on business loans than other loans 
in the early 1990s this seems well justified. However, the share of  business loans may 
also proxy for the demand for loans independently of risk, provided the demand for 
business loans depends differently than other loans  on  the used proper demand 
variables. CGLOSSN and NP  A are scaled in the estimatations reported by the total 
risk-weigted assets and off-balance sheet commitments.  11 
As the idea is to use CGLOSSN and NP  A variables to depict the perceived 
riskiness of  bank lending, they should be dated at around the beginning of the period 
of interest. However, the data problems discussed prevent from using any NPA data 
prior to the end of 1991 and any really meaningful CGLOSSN data prior to 1991. 
These first possible dates are therefore used. As the banks probably were aware of  the 
write-off needs for 1991 already some time during the year, and probably followed 
the evolution of delinquent loans through 1991, the variables dates this way probably 
reflect quite well the perceived risks of the existing loan stocks in the beginning of 
1991. 
Demand conditions are proxied with the same variables as in the companion 
paper ie.  the rate of growth of income dINC,  change in the unemployment rate 
dUNR,  the  share of construction and services employment in total employment 
CONSER , the share of urban population in total population URPOP.  One may 
assume that this  type  of variables  are  more  related to  the potential  borrowers' 
willingness to borror than the riskiness of such loans. But of course these variables 
also  may  signal  of the  riskiness  of lending  opportunities:  low  income,  high 
11  Also scaling with bank capital is experimented with but the results of such analyses are not reported 
as the results do not differ qualitatively from those reported and give in general a marginally inferior 
fit. 
22 unemployment, and say high share of the depressed services and constuction activity 
are likely to be associated with not only weak willingness to borrow but also with 
inability to service debt. 
Also as in the earlier paper, the market conditions are characterized, in addition 
to the demand variables, by a variable that seeks to depict the competitive situation 
in every operation area. The variable CPO obtains value 1, if none of the two main 
commercial banks of the time (KOP, SYP) has an office in the operation area of the 
bank considered, and 0 otherwise. 
un  depicts the loan deposit ratio in the beginning of the period. This variable 
is  intended to capture possible adjustment effects of the loan deposit ratio to  a 
common steady state value, if such a value exists. 
A variable measuring bank size is also included. As in the companion paper, the 
variable used, SIZE, is the logarithm of the number of employees of the bank. 
The ratio of gross credit losses to the loan stock, CLOSSG, is included in the 
regression  to  account  for  the  "technical"  change  in  the  loan  stock  due  to  the 
elimination from the loan books of the loans, which have been subject to write-offs 
during the period of interest. The typical procedure is that when a write-off on a loan 
is made, the loan as a whole is removed from the loan stock, and the residual value 
(collateral  value)  is  booked  under  some  other  item  (cash,  real  estate,  other 
receivables). CLOSSG differs from the earlier CGLOSSN in that in CLOSSG only 
credit losses are included and no deduction is made for recoveries of losses booked 
earlier and  for  compensations  from  the  credit insurance.  The latter is  a  priori 
important as many credits by the local banks have been partially insured by mutual 
credit insurance companies. 
Finally, the dummy variables DUMMY;'s are used to allow the constant term 
and the slope coefficient to differ between the savings banks and the cooperative 
banks, should that turn out to be important. The results of the earlier paper suggest 
that behaviour indeed may differ between the two banking groups. 
Let us restate the tests. The credit crunch or more specifically capital crunch 
hypothesis implies that the coefficient of CAP should significant and positive. In 
addition, for the behaviour to be consistent, the COST variable should obtain a 
significant negative coefficient. Thus finding of no capital and cost effects or negative 
capital efects and positive cost effects would be inconsistent with the credit crunch 
hypothesis. 
The borrower quality or collateral squeeze hypothesis  implies  that the risk 
variables  obtain significant negative  coefficients.  Thus  the  finding  of no  effect 
contradicts the hypothesis. 
The demand-for-credit hypothesis implies that the demand variables obtain 
significant  coefficients,  the  coefficient  of income  being  positive  and  that  of 
unemployment rate negative, or that at least combined their effect is significant. The 
signs of CONSER and URPOP are indeterminate. Finding no significant individual 
or combined effects suggests of weak role of the demand factors. 
23 3.3  Some preliminary observations about the data 
The data set contains banks with highly different characteristics. Lending growth 
between the end of 1990 and the end of 1992 varies from - 30 per cent to +40 per 
cent, the regulatory capital ratio DBARAT at the end of 1990 from 4 per cent to 35 
per cent, non-performing assets at the end of 1991 from 0 to 36 per cent of the risk-
weighted assets etc. (Table 2). 
There are also major differences between the two banking groups. While lending 
on average grew somewhat in the cooperative banks in both 1991  and 1992, it 
declined on average in both years in the savings banks. In terms of capital adequacy 
the cooperative banks were on average all  the time somewhat stronger than the 
savings  banks  by most  measures  reported.  The posted  capital  ratios  for  1992 
furthermore substantially overestimate the true capital position of many savings 
banks. The reported ratios for the member banks of the Savings Bank of Finland -
registered in August 1992 - do not take into account the pending credit losses to be 
booked at the end of the year, which in many cases exceeded the total regulatory 
capital by several times over. These were revealed in the audit of SBF in December 
1992. These additional credit losses, over FIM 4 billion in all for the SBF banks of 
the sample cannot be precisely allocated to the original SBF banks.  12 
Despite mounting credit and guarantee losses the average capital ratios remained 
relatively stable in the data set 1990 through 1992. This is due to several factors. 
First, as noted a substantial part of  the losses incurred ultimately by the savings banks 
did not materialize prior to the Autumn of 1992. Second, the risk-weighted assets of 
many banks declined substantially over the period. Third, the Government capital 
injection bolstered many banks' capital ratios substantially. 
A very rough way of examining the existence of a relationship between lending 
growth and bank capital is to plot them against one another. Such a plot for the 1990-
1992 rate of growth and the beginning-of-the-period CORRAT does not indicate any 
association at all between the two variables among the cooperative banks. Among the 
savings banks one may detect a positive association, but it would seem to be due to 
a couple of observations (Panels A and B of  Figure 2). The same holds also for other 
capital concepts and the cost variable. Thus, should there be a relationship of the 
credit crunch type, establishing such a relationship requires analysis of all the relevant 
factors simultaneously. 
In contrast, there seems to be a somewhat clearer negative relationship for the 
savings banks between growth of lending and riskiness of  bank lending as measured 
by the ratio of non-performing assets to the risk-weighted assets (incl. off-balance 
sheet commitments). 
12 An attempt to do so is nevertheless made to check to what extent the results obtained are sensitive 
to the extra loss of capital impJied. This is based on the data of SBF losses by the 32 internal "SBF 
districts". 
24 Table 2.  Some univariate statistics 
Coops  Savings 
mean  min  max  mean  min  max 
GL9290*  7.42  -17.22  41.72  -5.51  -29.70  21.64 
GL9190  5.41  -12.68  26.49  -1.32  -14.77  16.14 
GL9291  1.84  -17.64  22.52  -4.37  -17.51  13.87 
DBARAT90  13.37  4.85  35.71  11.49  4.00  23.60 
DBARAT91  14.64  5.91  29.69  12.08  1.97  21.86 
DBARAT92  16.05  4.68  30.58  12.46  3.14  27.18 
BISRAT90  8.59  3.28  25.05  8.54  2.42  20.88 
BISRAT91  9.38  3.73  17.19  8.97  1.86  20.83 
BISRAT92  10.29  2.86  20.10  9.27  2.96  23.23 
CORRAT90  7.53  1.73  25.05  8.03  2.25  19.37 
CORRAT91  7.77  2.10  15.72  7.98  1.76  18.90 
CORRAT92  8.31  2.06  17.40  8.03  2.45  20.27 
GOVK  0.36  -0.00  2.75  0.37  -0.00  2.12 
C90  0.04  0.02  0.11  0.03  0.02  0.07 
C91  0.04  0.02  0.06  0.04  0.02  0.06 
C92  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.03  0.06 
CGLOSSN91  0.42  -0.29  20.44  0.93  0.00  10.49 
CGLOSSN92  0.63  -1.27  10.45  9.66  0.00  34.56 
NPA91  7.84  0.00  26.65  13.22  0.12  61.67 
NPA92  10.15  0.00  48.45  43.82  17.64  73.90 
BUSSHA90  51.39  16.08  85.71  42.91  19.06  72.44 
DIN9290  0.10  -0.23  1.31  0.10  -0.14  0.48 
DUNR9290  9.96  1.48  21.30  9.48  2.50  13.38 
CONSER  0.55  0.13  0.95  0.60  0.32  0.85 
URPOP  0.51  0.00  0.98  0.60  0.00  0.98 
CPO  0.36  0.00  1.00  0.20  0.00  1.00 
L90D  1.02  0.48  2.07  1.12  0.63  1.93 
L91D  0.99  0.50  1.69  1.03  0.57  1.66 
L92D  0.94  0.48  1.73  0.99  0.49  2.25 
SIZE  2.84  0.69  6.33  3.95  1.79  6.86 
CLOSSG92  0.44  0.00  6.62  0.25  0.00  2.21 
CLOSSG91  0.22  0.00  5.01  0.59  0.00  3.40 
* Reading guide: GL9290 is the growth rate of lending (per cent) between end of 1990 and end of 
1992 
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40 4  The empirical results 
In what follows the empirical experiments are reported starting with the estimation 
of the loan equation (1). First, in section 4.1, we report the results concerning the 
whole period between the end of 1990 and the end of 1992. ill this particular attention 
is paid to the statistical properties of the model. Section 4.2 examines the stability of 
the estimated loan relationship over time and the robustness of the results in some 
other ways as well. Section 4.3 summarizes the results on the loan equation. This is 
followed by a brief examination of  the behaviour of subordinated debt in section 4.4. 
4.1  The basic results for 1991-1992 
As there are good reasons to believe that bank behaviour has differed between the 
two banking groups considered, the coefficients of all "bank related" variables ie. 
other variables than those associated with demand for loans or competitive situation 
are in principle allowed to differ across the two groups. This is done by including 
savings bank dummies for both the intercept and slope coefficients in a preliminary 
OLS regression.13 To reduce the number of  parameters to be estimated, the dummy 
variables which are insignificant at the  10  per cent significance level  are  then 
dropped. The OLS estimates of the parameters of the resulting equation with three 
savings bank dummy variables and three alternative capital variables dated at the 
beginning of the period are reported in Table 3. ill all equations the government 
capital injection variable GOVK is included. ill addition to the coefficient estimates 
and t-values, also the tests for the joint significance of four sets of coefficients are 
reported: (i) the capital and cost variables, (ii) the credit loss and non-performing 
asset  variables,  (iii)  the  credit  loss,  non-performing  assets  and  business  share 
variable,  and  (iv)  the  four  demand  variables.  Given the  difference  allowed  in 
behaviour between the cooperative banks and the savings banks the tests (ii) and (iii) 
are calculated separately for the two groups. Due to missing data on BUSSHA, 7 
observations have to be skipped resulting in the sample size of 388 observations. 
The equations explain over 40 per cent of the variation of lending growth. This 
is less than what was obtained for lending growth over 4 years in the analysis of the 
boom period but of the same order of magnitude obtained for the subperiod 1988-
1990. It also compares well with most credit crunch studies with cross-section data; 
Bernanke and Lown for example report equations with R2 's of  the order of 10 per 
cent. 
None of the capital variables is significant. Neither is the cost variable. ill fact, 
apart from constant (for the coops), only non-performing assets (savings banks), the 
share of  business loans (coops) , bank size and the technical correction due to write-
offs appear significant. The equation may nevertheless be seriously misspecified. 
13 Essentially the same result would have obtained if all parameters had been allowed to differ in the 
preliminary regression. The only exception is the coefficient of CLOSSN which in that case do not 
differ significantly between the two groups. 
27 Although no heteroscedasticity is suggested by the White test, the larque-Bera test 
suggests that the error term cannot be considered normally distributed. 14 
Table 3.  OLS equation with thebeginning-of-the-period capital 
Dependent variable GL9290 
BISRAT90  DBARAT90  CORRAT90 (BIS) 
Yariable  coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value 
ficient  ficient  ficient 
CONSTANT,  CB'S  31.0  5.42***  29.9  5.16***  32.0  5.74*** 
SB'S  12.1  1.89*  11.0  1.74*  13.3  2.05** 
CAP:  .01  .08  .06  .54  -.06  -.34 
GOY. CAP  .94  1.51  .97  1.56  .93  1.48 
COST  -.45  -.01  2.00  .03  -4.26  -.07 
CGLOSS91  -.23  -.68  -.23  -.67  -.22  -.67 
NPA91  CB'S  -.08  -.89  -.08  -.90  -.08  -.87 
SB'S  -.46  -3.40***  -.46  -3.37***  -.46  -3.40*** 
BUSSHA,  CB'S  -.23  -5.54***  -.23  -5.56***  -.23  -5.52*** 
SB'S  .01  .06  .00  .04  .00  .04 
DINC  -4.32  -.97  -4.21  -.95  4.39  -.99 
DUNR  -.33  -1.59  -.33  -1.59  -.33  -1.60 
CONSER  .60  .18  .49  .15  .65  .20 
URPOP  -.43  -.16  .34  -.12  -.46  -.18 
CPO  -1.66  -1.62  -1.68  -1.64  -1.64  -1.60 
LID  .13  .04  .47  .18  -.23  -.09 
SIZE  -2.32  -4.58***  -2.32  -4.56***  2.32  -4.57*** 
CLOSSG  -1.12  -1.99**  -1.14  -2.03**  -1.10  -1.96* 
ADJ.R2  .42  .42  .42 
WHITE, (sign. level)  .982  .986  .974 
JARQUE-BERA, 
(sign.level)  .00  .00  .00 
TESTS: Significance levels 
CAP & COST  .52  .46  .50 
CGL&NPA 
CB'S  .05  .51  .52 
SB'S  .00  .00  .00 
CGL&NPA  CB'S  .00  .00  .00 
&BUS  SB'S  .00  .00  .00 
DEMAND  .52  .53  .51 
As discussed above, measuring capital at the beginning of the period may not be 
appropriate. An obvious alternative is the end of the two-year period. The central 
results of such regressions are reported in Table 4. Now the effect of bank capital 
(excluding the government supplied capital) on lending appears to be significantly 
negative, imespective of the exact capital variable used. The effect is particularly 
strong when core capital is used as the capital variable. But this effect may be due to 
the  simultaneity  problem  discussed  above.  To  overcome  it,  one  needs  to  use 
instrumental variables approach in the estimation. 
14 For these diagnostic tests see White (1980), and Jarque and Bera (1980). 






WHITE, (sign. level) 
J-B, (sign. level) 
OLS equation with the end-of-period capital, the capital 
and cost effects 
BISRAT92*  DBARAT92*  CORRAT92*  . 
coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value 
ficient  ficient  ficient 
-.31  -2.18**  -.21  -1.84*  -.61  -3.96*** 
.75  1.20  .65  1.02  .60  .97 
-24.8  -.42  -15.2  -.26  -46.4  -.80 
.43  .43  .45 
.515  .003  .876 
.00  .00  .00 
* The government capital injection excluded. 
However, before turning to the instrumental variables estimation, the problem of the 
indicated non-normality of the error terms must be tackled. Just as the coefficients 
of the other variables than capital are not affected by the change in the dating of the 
capital variables, the J arque-Bera test suggests of non-normality of the error term 
also in the case of the Table 4 equation. A closer look reveals, that the residual series 
displays both non-zero skewness and kurtosis. There are outliers, the behaviour of 
which cannot be well described by the equation with a normally distributed error. 
Furthermore, the specification with DBARAT fails to meet the homoscedasticity 
assumption which also is required for the OLS to be efficient. 
There are in principle two ways of  handling the outlier problem. One is to simply 
discard a selected group  of observations. The other one is  to  use  some robust 
estimation technique. It has been shown that in many typical cases of non-normality, 
minimizing the sum of absolute deviations is superior to least squares, see ego Harvey 
(1981). The least absolute deviations estimator (LAD) gives much less weight to far-
away observations but does not discount them fully as constraining the sample does. 
However, using such a technique poses a problem, as combining it with instrumental 
variables estimation is difficult. A two-stage strategy is therefore chosen. We first 
estimate the equations of  Table 4 with LAD, and eliminate from the sample enough 
observations with high absolute residual value to make the residual series pass the 
Jarque-Bera test. We then apply least squares instrumenting for the end-of-period 
capital variable.  The instruments used are  all  the exogenous variables plus the 
beginning-of-the-period capital variable. Setting the highest allowed absolute residual 
value  at  2.5  times  the  standard  deviation  of the  LAD-residual,  eliminates  10 
observations and makes the residual from the regression with the remaining 378 
observations pass the normality test. 15 The excluded observations are typically small 
cooperative banks. The LAD results and some characteristics of the excluded outliers 
15 The exact procedure used was to discard observations the LAD residual of which was in absolute 
value more than 3,  2.5, and 2 times the standard deviation of the residual series, to  run  an  OLS 
regression to check the Jarque-Bera statistic. 2.5 times the standard deviation was a sufficient limit for 
all equations (with different capital variables). 
29 are reported in Appendix 2.  The instrumental variables estimates are reported in 
Table 5. 
Table 5.  Instrumental variables estimation with the end-or-period 
capital, 10 outliers excluded 
Dependent variable GL9290 
BISRAT92*  DBARAT92*  CORRAT92* 
Yariable  coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value 
ficient  ficient  ficient 
CONSTANT,  CB'S  26.4  4.60***  24.3  3.85***  26.4  4.74*** 
SB'S  9.6  1.55  7.6  1.19  9.8  1.58 
CAP:  -.06  -.34  .03  .22  -.08  -.39 
GOY. CAP  .83  1.48  .92  1.54  .82  1.48 
COST  -20.0  -.38  -13.3  -.26  -20.9  -.40 
CGLOSS91  -.15  -.52  -.15  -.54  -.15  -.52 
NPA91  CB'S  -.01  -.14  -.00  -.05  -.01  -.14 
SB'S  -.51  -4.27***  -.50  -4.13***  -.50  -4.27*** 
BUSSHA,  CB'S  -.19  -5.18***  -.19  -5.14***  -.19  -5.18*** 
SB'S  .02  .31  .03  .34  .02  .30 
DINC  -1.77  -.46  -2.05  -.52  -1.75  -.45 
DUNR  -.20  -1.12  -.20  -1.10  -.20  -1.12 
CONSER  .49  .18  .40  .14  .53  .19 
URPOP  -2.71  -1.17  -2.58  -1.09  -2.69  -1.16 
CPO  -2.06  -2.31**  -2.07  -2.30**  -2.05  -2.30** 
LID  1.06  .46  1.61  .67  .95  .40 
SIZE  -1.75  -3.94***  -1.74  -3.86***  -1.75  -3.95*** 
CLOSSG  -1.21  -2.46**  -1.23  -2.49**  -1.21  -2.48*** 
ADlR2  0.47  0.46  0.47 
TESTS: Significance levels 
CAP & COST  0.43  .45  .42 
CGL&NPA 
CB'S  0.86  .86  .86 
SB'S  .00  .00  .00 
CGL&NPA  CB'S  .00  .00  .00 
&BUS  SB'S  .00  .00  .00 
DEMAND  .56  .58  .56 
* Excludes the government capital injection 
The N  results for the non-outlier sample resemble remarkably the OLS results for the 
whole sample. In particular, the capital variables and the cost variable again turn out 
insignficant irrespective the operationalization of capital. The government capital 
injection again obtains a positive coefficient but fails to be significant for any capital 
concept examined. The only qualitative difference is that, unlike in Table 3, now the 
competitive situation matters; epo obtains a significant negative coefficient. 
As discussed earlier, the capital ratios of the SBF banks as recorded in August 
or September 1992 do not incorporate the substantial losses booked by the SBF in 
December. However, if the estimated additional bank level losses are deducted from 
30 the recorded 1992 core capital, and the equations are reestimated with the adjusted 
capital ratios as  explanatory variable, no qualitative changes obtain. The capital 
variables still remain insignificant, and the risk variables retain their significance. 
Given the insensitivity of the results, these experiments are not reported in detail. 
Thus the growth in the local banks' loan stock appears to have been the smaller 
in 1991-1992, the more non-performing assets at the end of 1991  (savings banks), 
the more business loans in the portfolio (cooperative bank) and the larger the bank. 
In addition, if there was no commercial bank presence in the local bank's operation 
area, contraction of credit was stronger. And even after accounting for these factors, 
the savings banks contracted lending in 1991-1992 stronger than the cooperative 
banks. 
4.2  Stability over time and some other checks of 
robustness 
With the drastic steepening of  the economic crisis through 1991 and 1992, the banks' 
situation evolved rapidly. It is quite possible that bank behaviour as a result changed 
in response to mounting non-performings assets and credit losses and the general 
economic decline. To examine this possibility the equation with anticipated core 
capital  (excluding the  government capital injection)  as  the capital  variable was 
estimated separately for 1991 and 1992. For the reasons discussed earlier, the credit 
and guarantee loss variable CGLOSSN and the non-performing asset variable NP  A 
were dated in both regressions in 1991  and at the end of 1991, respectively. The 
estimation technique is IV and the same 10 outliers are excluded as in the previous 
equations. The results are reported in the first two columns in Table 6. 
The results indeed display significant difference in behaviour over time. The 
equation fits better for 1992 than for 1991. As  1992 was much worse in terms of 
credit losses, non-performing assets etc., this suggests that credit risk indeed was very 
important for the determination ofloan volumes in the early 1990s. 
The most striking difference concerns the effect of  bank capital. While it remains 
insignificant in the first sub-period, it obtains a significantly negative coefficient in 
the  1992 regression.  Instead, addition to capital through the government capital 
injection continues to be insignificant. The cost variable remains insignificant in all 
versions. Credit growth in 1992 reacts more negatively to non-performing assets and 
the the share of  business loans than in 1991. Interestingly, the reaction of the savings 
banks changes sign. In ·1991 the savings banks decreased lending the higher the share 
of business loans at the end of 1990 while in 1992 they decreased lending the higher 
that share was at the end of 1991 just as the cooperative banks. Demand factors also 
become significant in 1992 in contrast to 1991: unemployment and the share of urban 
population exerted negative impacts on bank lending in 1992. 
31 Table 6.  IV estimates for 1991 and 1992 separately 
Period  Dependent variable  Dependent variable GL9291 
GL9190 
. CAP=  CAP=  CAP=  CAP= 
CORRAT91  CORRAT92*  CORRAT92*  CORRAT92* 
Variable  coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value 
ficient  ficient  ficient  ficient 
CONSTANT  CB'S  8.82  2.25***  19.3  5.82***  21.6  5.86***  20.8  6.46*** 
SB'S  -2.91  -.65  14.3  4.01 ***  16.2  4.05***  16.8  4.75*** 
CAP  .19  1.36  -.29  -3.15***  -.30  -2.98***  -.27  -3.00*** 
GOV.CAP  - - .39  1.17  .42  1.17  .60  1.86* 
COST  -.17  -.48  -.57  -1.53  -.33  -.79  -.61  -1.65* 
CGLOSS91  -.20  -.97  -.00  -.02  -.02  -.09  -.00  -.00 
NPA  CB'S  -.20  -.39  -.00  -.00  -.03  -.48  -.03  -.73 
SB'S  -.21  -2.62***  -.33  -4.71***  -.33  -4.20***  -.33  -4.83*** 
BUSSHA,  CB'S  -.08  -3.18***  -.11  -5.20***  -.13  -5.52***  -.12  -5.59*** 
SB'S  .09  1.73*  -.D7  -1.68*  -.09  -1.83*  - .11  -2.49** 
DINC  .96  .19  2.41  .97  1.49  .54  2.49  1.03 
DUNR  .03  .16  -.30  -1.70*  -.42  -2.09**  -.40  -2.24** 
CONSER  -.06  -.03  .76  .46  .72  .39  .66  .42 
URPOP  .61  .37  -3.39  -2.46**  -2.59  -1.71*  -2.55  -1.92* 
CPO  -.65  -1.05  -1.30  -2.44**  -1.23  -2.07**  -1.28  -2.48** 
UD  1.70  1.00  -1.20  -.80  -1.62  -.98  -1.51  -1.05 
SIZE  -.74  -2.51**  -.88  -3.27***  -1.18  -3.99***  -1.02  -3.94*** 
CLOSSG  .72  -1.09  -1.23  -3.33***  -1.22  -2.99***  -1.19  -3.34*** 
ADJ. R2  .29  .42  .39  .45 
SAMPLE  excl. 10 outliers  excl. 10 outliers  incl. outliers  excl. 7 outliers 
N=  378  378  388  381 
TESTS: Significance levels 
CAP & COST  .30  .00  .01  .00 
CGL&NPA 
CB'S  .54  .99  .88  .75 
SB'S  .02  .00  .00  .00 
CGL& NPA  CB'S  .011  .00  .00  .00 
& BUS  SB'S  .013  .00  .00  .00 
DEMAND  .99  .03  .08  .03 
* = end-of-1992 tier-I capital (BIS) excluding the government capital injection. 
The capital effect in  1992 requires further examination to ascertain that it is  not 
simply an artifact associated with the particular sample. It is also interesting to know 
whether  it  obtains  only  with  the  anticipated  core  capital  or  also  with  other 
specifications. We therefore estimated the equation with both all observation and 
excluding observations that turned out outliers with the 2.5 standard error criterion 
in a LAD regression on the 1992 data. These results are reported in the last two 
columns of in Table 6. They show that the negative effect of capital on lending is not 
a result of a small number of outliers or their exclusion but is rather robust to small 
changes in the data set. In contrast, the effects of  the government supplied capital and 
bank costs are sensitive to these changes in the data set. One should therefore not 
make any strong conclusion on these variables. 
The results of a negative effect of bank capital on lending in 1992 does not 
depend on the timing of the CORRAT variable either. If  CORRA  T dated in the 
beginning of the period is used instead of the end-of-period CORRAT, qualitatively 
32 the same result obtains. On the other hand, the relevant capital variable indeed seems 
to be the core capital. Unlike in the whole-period estimation, CORRAT now is 
superior to both BISRAT and particularly to BDARAT (Table A3.1 in Appendix 3). 
Given the perverse effect of bank capital on lending in  1992, the -question 
naturally arises, whether this phenonemon could be associated with particular types 
of banks. To investigate this we split the sample in three ways to separate a priori 
"weak" banks from a priori "strong" ones. The three splits are "bislow" banks ie. the 
banks whose BISRAT at the end of 1991 was below 8 per cent vs. "bishigh" banks 
(the rest), "npahigh" banks ie. the banks whose NPA ratio at the end of 1991 was 
above the medium value vs. the "npalow" banks (the rest), and finally the savings 
banks vs. the cooperative banks. The gist of the regression results are presented in 
Table 7, the full results in tables A3.2 and A3.3 of Appendix 3. 
Two observations stand out from the sub-sample regressions. First, the equation 
explains much better the behaviour of the weak banks both in the capital ratio sense 
and the non-performing asset sense; the R2 's are at least twice as high for the weak 
banks than for the strong banks. This suggests that bank capitalization and portfolio 
credit risks indeed were important for the banks' loan supply: For the banks whose 
capital position was strong or the share of problem assets low, the changes in the loan 
stock cannot be very well explained by the examined factors, while these factors 
exerted a strong influence on the weak banks' behaviour.  Similarily the lending 
behaviour of the a priori weak savings banks can be much better accounted for than 
that of the a priori strong cooperative banks. 
The second observation is that the perverse response of lending to capital is not 
a feature of weak banks either in terms of the capital ratio or share of  non-performing 
assets, but if anything, obtaips among the strong banks. Similarily, the perverse effect 
obtains rather among the cooperative banks than among the savings banks which 
were on average plagued with much more serious asset quality and capital problems 
than the cooperative banks. This is in sharp contrast to the results of the companion 
study on the  1980s, which suggested that particularly the savings savings banks' 
behaviour  was  characterized  by  moral  hazard.  The  estimation  results  for  the 
cooperative banks are nevertheless somewhat problematic, as the cost variable also 
obtains a significant negative coefficient at the 5 per cent level. This is difficult to 
reconcile with the negative capital effect, as the theoretical model does not allow both 
coefficients to be negative. However, as noted above the results concerning bank 
costs may not be very reliable as they are rather sensitive to small changes in the data 
set. 
In any case, these findings suggest that to the extent there was a "gamble for 
resurrection" in 1992, and some of it is indeed indicated, it took place among the 
"better" banks. How is this possible? A reasonable explanation might be that the 
weaker banks  were prevented from  additional  risk taking by regulatory  action. 
However, it is very difficult to verify this conjecture. There has been no equivalent 
in  Finland  for  the  formal  regulatory  enforcement  actions,  which  have  been 
implemented in the U.S., and which in the analysis of Peek and Rosengren (1995a) 
turn out to be highly significant explanatory factors for credit contraction. Classifying 
banks according to some criteria which a priori might have to do with regulatory 
stringency did not result in any clear distinction in behaviour between the supposedly 
strictly regulated and less strictly regulated banks, and these results are not reported. 
33 Table 7.  Comparison of the capital and cost effects in subsets of banks 
BISLOW  BISHIGH  NPAHIGH  NPALOW  SA  VINGS BANKS  COOPERATIVE 
BANKS 
Variable  coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value 
ficient  ficient  ficient  ficient  ficient  ficient 
CAP: CORRAT92*  -.10  -.33  - Al  -3.11***  - .19  -1.66*  -.37  -2047*  -.13  -.64  -.41  -4.13*** 
GOV. CAP  .75  1.34  043  1.03  .31  .78  .99  1.71  1.60  1.79*  .00  .00 
COST  -1.50  -2.20**  -.72  -1.59  -.65  -1.35  -.62  -1.04  -.16  -.22  -.91  -2.16** 
ADJ. R2  0.67  .29  .55  .25  .55  .22 
N  124  257  195  186  79  302 The finding that bank capital had a statistically significant impact on bank lending 
only in 1992 but not in 1991 or over the period as a whole, prevents a useful analysis 
of the  response  of different  loan  categories  to  capital.  The  1992  data  on  the 
breakdown of loans into lending to different sectors are missing on an important 
subset  of the  banks  under  investigation.  An  (unreported)  examination  of the 
determinants  of the  1991  growth  rates  of business  loans  and  household  loans 
indicates no impact of  capital on lending just as there is no impact on the aggregate 
loan stock. A noteworthy finding is that unemployment seemed to affect only lending 
to the households, not that to the firms. The unemployment rate is thus likely to proxy 
for the willingness to borrow by the households rather than the general condition of 
the local economy. The rather bad fits furthermore indicates that the behaviour of the 
aggregate can be much better explained by the bank characteristics than that of the 
individual lending components. This gives some confidence that the aggregate loan 
variable focused in other empirical exercises indeed is the relevant loan concept. 
4.3  Conclusions from the loan equation estimation 
The estimation results do not contain any evidence of a credit crunch in the sense that 
bank capital had constrained bank lending in 1991 or 1992. No significant positive 
effect of bank capital on bank lending can be detected once one controls for the 
riskiness of bank portfolio and market conditions in the local market. Although in 
certain subsets of the observations a negative cost effect is found, this is not a robust 
results. These results do not depend on the exact definition of bank capital used; all 
examined alternatives yield the same conclusion in this regard. 
The finding that there was an inverse relationship between bank size and lending 
growth further supports this conclusion. One would namely expect that the capital 
constraints would, ceteris paribus, be stiffer for small than large banks, as the latter 
presumably have advantages of  lower transctions costs in the capital market, and may 
also benefit from potential "too-big-to-fail" policies. The negative effect of bank size 
on growth of lending may in part have to do with differences in the composition of 
lending unaccounted for by the business share and demand variables. But may also 
reflect the weak deposit growth of the larger banks reported in Appendix 1. To the 
extent this is true, it suggests of a "credit crunch" due to financing difficulties for 
some other reason than weak capital. 
As far as  capital is concerned, the results suggest that, if anything,  a strong 
capital position (as measured by core or Tier-I capital) implied in 1992 less lending. 
Thus the perverse incentive effects found in the analysis of the boom period appear 
to have held also for at least some banks in 1992. However, the results are somewhat 
difficult to interpret on this score, particularly in comparison with the 1980s results. 
First, the perverse effects obtain only in 1992 but not in 1991. Second the types of 
banks that appear to be plagued with moral hazard are somewhat surprising. The 
perverse effect can be observed among the better capitalized banks or banks with 
less-than-average credit risks in the portfolio, and among the cooperative banks rather 
than the  savings banks.  Furthermore,  only the  capital variable but not the  cost 
variable indicates perverse reactions. In the  1980s, it was the savings banks that 
displayed bad behaviour rather than the cooperative banks, and the same type of 
effect obtained both for the capital variable and the cost variable. 
35 These findings suggest that a change in bank behaviour took place in the early 
1990s. The savings and weak banks in general adopted a more conservative attitude 
towards lending, while among stronger banks, typically cooperative banks, there 
emerged an attempt overcome the difficulties of capital adequacy and delinquent 
assets through further extension of  credit. The theoretical model suggests two reasons 
for these type of discrepancies. One is that the pricing of the weak banks' / savings 
banks' marginal funds became more responsive to risk, while no change or change 
in the opposite direction took place for the strong banks / cooperative banks. The 
other possibility is that regulatory pressures on the weak banks became much more 
stringend in the 1990s than they had been in the 1980s, while no such change took 
place for the stronger banks. Naturally both factors may have worked simultaneously. 
Some broad observations support both of these hypotheses. The savings banks 
as a group started to receive more regulatory attention in 1991 with the mounting 
problems and the eventual failure of their central bank Skopbank in the Autumn of 
1991. The take-over of the Skopbank including an immediate dismissal of the top 
management by the authorities not only signalled what could happen to failing banks 
but it also made the savings banks very directly dependent on the authorities. For 
example, the solvency of many savings banks was greatly affected by the valuation 
of  the so-called K-shares issued by the Skopbank and held by the savings banks. In 
1992 about half of  the savings bank unit merged to form the Savings Bank Finland, 
the member banks of which undoubtedly were closely scrutinized by the authorities 
already prior to the merger. In these circumstances the possibilities to continue to 
increase risk by expansionary lending ego to customers already in financial distress 
presumably radically declined.  16 There is also some evidence of market pressures on 
savings banks financing; the savings banks appeared to have lost deposits despite 
higher pricing in 1991 and 1992. 
There was no equivalent to the Skopbank crisis in the cooperative bank group 
and the cooperative banks did not seem to have problems with their deposit funding 
either. On the other hand, the cooperative banks benefited, as did other banks, of the 
repeated signals of  the authorities of  their willingness to support the banking systems' 
liquidity and solvency.17 Thus the lending decisions of the banks, which due to their 
weak state were not directly subject stringent regulatory control, may not have been 
too much constrained in 1991 or 1992. 
In contrast to the failure of the capital crunch hypothesis, the collateral squeeze 
hypothesis receives rather strong support in the data. The riskiness of bank lending 
as proxied by the ratio of non-performing assets to risk  -weighted assets and the share 
of  business loans in total loans exerts a clear negative effect on lending. Furthermore, 
the finding that the capital variable as such in no case had a positive effect on lending 
suggests that the risk variables do not primarily proxy for anticipated losses in capital 
but riskiness of lending opportunities, and perhaps as far as BUSSHA is concerned 
also pure demand effects ie. customers' willingness to borrow. 
16 In terms of the theoretical model one would say that the expected penalty for a failure to meet the 
regulatory  requirement  was  increasing  as  probably  both  the  frequency  and  thoroughness  of 
examination increased so that the banks for example could not get away with too small write-offs. 
17 Examples of  the readiness for bank support are the rescue of the Skopbank in September 1991, the 
Government offer of capital injection and the establishment of the Government Guarantee Fund in the 
Spring of 1992 and the Government's statement about the support of the banking system in August 
1992. 
36 However, unlike in the analysis of the 1980s, the variables that were constructed 
to  reflect  demand did  not  turn  out  to  be  particularly  important,  although  ego 
unemployment had a negative effect on growth of  lending in 1992. An interpretation 
could be that the customers who were not forced to borrow in 1991 or 19.92, did not 
want to raise much additional credit but rather were happy to let their credit stocks 
decline with the amortization plans. Thus most genuine demand side impulses came 
from the financially distressed borrowers, and the extent to which this demand was 
satisfied by the  banks,  depended  on the  bank characteristics.  In addition,  the 
competitive situation seems to have mattered: in the absence of commercial bank 
presence in the local market, the local banks were more likely to cut lending than 
otherwise. 
5  Subordinated debt 
As was discussed in section 2, subordinated debt may also be informative about the 
pricing principle of  banks' marginal liabilities or enforcement of capital regulations. 
In VihritiHi (1996c) it was shown that the subordinated debt volumes issued by the 
cooperative banks and savings banks were consistent with the hypothesis that either 
money market debt was  underpriced or the banks  did not expect any positive 
penalties for capital insufficiency or both. These conclusion was particularly clear in 
the case of  the savings banks. Importantly, the findings about subordinated debt were 
in line with the premise of the model that demand for subordinated debt is highly 
elastic: the banks willing to issue such debt were able to do so without significant 
lemons premia. 
In the early 1990s both the cooperative banks and the savings banks increased 
the issuance of  subordinated debt. But still at the end of 1992 both types of  banks had 
on average far less subordinated debt outstanding than could have been counted 
towards the regulatory maximum (50 per cent of Tier-I capital). And although the 
average share rose more among the savings banks, most savings banks still had zero 
subordinated debt in 1992 (Table 8). 
Table 8.  Use of subordinated debt 
Cooperative  Savings banks, 
banks, N = 313  N=82 
1990  1992  1990  1992 
Number of banks with zero subordinated debt  5  40  58  55 
Number of banks with the share of 
subordinated debt in TIER-I capital greater  16  38  0  3 
than the regulatory maximum = 0.5, 
"SUBSHA" 
Average SUBSHA  .19  .22  .02  .08 
37 However, one cannot exclude the possibility that in the period of general financial 
distress in 1991 and 1992, the market for subordinated debt was not anymore willing 
to absorb additional issues without significant lemons premia. Thus although the 
banks now would have liked to issue subordinated debt, buyers. may not have.been 
around to the same extent as before. Should the potential lemons premia have been 
significant, one would expect that the change in the ratio of subordinated debt over 
Tier-I capital  would  be  negatively  associated  with  the  bank  credit  risk.  More 
specifically in terms of the variables used in this analysis, the change should be 
positively  associated  with  equity  capital  (the  capital  adequacy  ratio  excluding 
subordinated debt) and negatively associated with the share of nonperforming assets. 
Table 9 reports equations for the change in the ratio of subordinated debt over 
Tier-I capital (AsUBSHA) in the period end of 1990 - end of 1992. The behaviour 
of the cooperative banks' subordinated debt is essentially random, only 3 per cent of 
variation  can be explained by the  beginning-of-the  period  SUBSHA, UD and 
CORRA  T90,  NP  A91  as  well  as  by size.  Of these only CORRAT90 obtains  a 
significant - negative - coefficient suggesting of a continued - and at least to some 
extent succesful - attempt of the weakly capitalized banks to add to capital through 
issuance of subordinated debt. Thus availability of subordinated debt does not appear 




Simple models of subordinated debt 
OLS equation for the change in SUBSHA 1990-1992a) 
COOPS  SAVINGS 
Constant  .03  -.29 
(.42)  (-3.19***) 
SUBSHA90  -.01  .25 
(-.16)  (.44) 
LID90  .00  .22 
(.03)  (2.55) 
CORRAT90  -.006  .002 
(-2.01 **)  (.76) 
NDA91  .001  -.006 
(.38)  ( -2.32**) 
SIZE  .016  .034 
(1.58)  (3.30***) 
IF  .03  .28 
a)  From the cooperative banks'  data set 10  outliers are excluded. The 
savings bank data are used as such. Correction for heteroscedasticity is 
applied to both equations. A much larger fraction of  the change in the savings banks SUBSHA can be explained 
by the explanatory variables. In this case, no significant relationship exists between 
the capital ratio and the change in SUBSHA. However, non-performing assets have 
a significant negative effect and bank size a significant  positive effect on the issuance 
of subordinated debt.· This suggests that the weak savings banks could not issue 
subordinated debt as the cooperative banks could and as also the savings banks had 
been able to do up to 1990. 
One way to shed additional light to the determination of subordinated debt 
would be to look directly at the yields of subordinated debt relative to senior bank 
liabilities of  the same maturity. Unfortunately, the data on such yields are very scanty. 
Some rough calculations based on a relatively small number of subordinated debt 
yields at issue suggest of no subordinated debt premium in the yields relative to 
senior debt. However, that does not constitute strong evidence against difficulties in 
the issuance of subordinated debt in the crisis period, as quantitative rationing may 
have been the main vehicle of limiting investor risk. 
In sum, the observations about the issuance of subordinated debt suggest that the 
local banks in general and the savings banks in particular perceived very small or no 
penalties at all from a failure to fulfil the capital requirements by 1990. During the 
crisis period the banks increased their use of subordinated debt, although only a 
handful of banks reached the regulatory maximum. Now savings banks were in 
relative terms somewhat more active in the issuance of net debt. This change also 
seems  to be consistent with the  observed differences  in  the  lending behaviour 
between the two banking groups. In this period the savings banks appeared to be 
more conservative. That the savings banks nevertheless did not in general reach the 
regulatory maximum may have been due to constraints imposed at this stage on the 
issuers of subordinated debt by the investors in an environment of general financial 
distress and increased uncertainty. In the case of the cooperative banks, there is no 
evidence of such constraints, suggesting that the failure to use such debt up to the 
regulaory maximum in  1991  and 1992 reflected unwillingness of the cooperative 
banks to do so. 
6  Conclusions 
The estimation results of a reduced form loan growth equation on cooperative and 
savings bank data do not give support to the hypothesis of a credit crunch or capital 
crunch in the sense that bank capital had constrained lending on the margin in 1991 
or  1992.  After  controlling  for  the  riskiness  of lending,  demand  for  loans,  the 
competitive situation, and the change in the credit stock due to credit losses, no 
significant positive effect of bank capital on lending is found. Consistently with this, 
in general bank costs failed to have a negative impact on bank lending. 
The results thus overturn the findings by Solttila and Vihriiilii (1992), which 
suggested of a statistically significant even though quantitatively weak capital crunch 
in  1991. Their analysis was nevertheless based on only the savings banks data, 
controlled for  the demand factors  only very roughly and and  not at all  for  the 
competitive conditions. Furthermore, in the statistically best formulation of their 
analysis,  the  capital  concept  used  incorporated  the  anticipated  effect  of non-
performing assets on bank capital. Thus, in part the estimated effect of bank capital 
39 reflected  - in  the  light  of this  analysis  - wrongly  the  riskiness  of lending 
opportunities. These differences in the results are in line with much of the American 
literature on the credit slow  down in the early 1990s. Once risk and demand factors 
are brought to bear, the constraints imposed by bank capital appear less important 
(Berger and Udell, Lown and Wenninger). 
In the present analysis high credit risks of lending and weak demand for credit 
were the main factors behind the weak growth (the cooperative banks) and decline 
(the savings banks) of lending in 1991  and 1992. In other words, weak borrower 
quality or "collateral squeeze" combined with the unwillingness of creditworthy 
borrowers to borrow dominated the overall behaviour of credit. Also the competitive 
situation appears to have played a role: the presence of commercial banks in the local 
market had a positive effect on the local banks' extension of credit. Finally, even 
taking into account the effects of risk,  demand and competition,  savings banks 
contracted lending more than the cooperative banks. 
To the extent significant effects of  bank capital on lending were found, they were 
- just as in the analysis of the late 1980s - of the opposite nature: weak capital 
induced banks to increase lending. This suggests that the factors which were likely 
to create the moral  hazard problem of 1980s - implicit creditor protection and 
insufficiently stiff regulation or perhaps better inadequate enforcement of regulations 
- had not at least fully disappeared by 1992. It seems however that these factors had 
not remained unchanged either. 
The negative effect of bank capital on lending appears to hold only in 1992 of 
the two years and only for some subset of the banks examined. Furthermore, the 
government capital injection of 1992 does not seem to be associated with a negative 
lending effect. The perverse effect can be found rather among the strong banks in 
terms of capital asset ratios and the amount of problem assets than among the weak 
ones, and among the cooperative banks rather than the savings banks. This is  in 
contrast to the findings for the 1980s, when perverse effects were characteristic to the 
savings banks and weak banks in general. Bank behaviour appears to have changed 
in the early 1990s. 
A reasonble explanation is  that in the early  1990s pressures from both the 
creditors and regulators started to limit the weak banks' and particularly the savings 
banks' possibilities and willingness of risk taking while such pressures were small or 
non-existent for stronger banks ie. typically cooperative banks. 
Although  in  general  the  creditors  continued  to  believe  in  the  banks' 
creditworthiness, probably not least thanks to the strong public sector support to the 
banking system, the savings banks experienced some loss of deposits in 1991 and 
1992.  In contrast,  the  cooperative banks  did not seem  to  face  such  problems. 
Similarily, risky savings banks (the banks with high shares of non-performing assets) 
failed to increase the use of subordinated debt to improve the regulatory capital ratios 
in the same period, in contrast to the corresponding cooperative banks and in contrast 
to the late 1980s. This is another indication of market pressures on the weak savings 
banks. 
On the regulatory side, increasing attention started to  be paid to  the savings 
banks through 1991 and in 1992. Particularly the close scrutiny and the ultimate take-
over of the Skopbank in 1991 by the authorities made the savings banks not only 
aware of the consequences of a failure but also made them in several ways highly 
. dependent on the authorities.  The perceived penalties for  a failure to  satisfy the 
supervisors' requirements presumably increased as a consequence. No such direct 
40 regulatory  pressures  existed  on  the  cooperative  bank  side,  and  these  banks 
presumably only benefited from the clearly articulated commitment of the authorities 
to support the banking system. 
These arguments lead to the following characterization of  bank behaviour in the 
early  1990s:  The  weakest  banks  in  terms  of capital  adequacy  and  credit  risks 
contracted lending strongly due to regulatory and market pressures. Among these 
banks the exact levels of capital ratios were not very important. The regulatory and 
market pressures were not as strong towards the better capitalized banks or banks 
with  lesser  credit  risks  on  the  balance  sheet.  Among  these  banks,  typically 
cooperative banks, an element of "gample for resurrection" can be detected in 1992: 
the  lower the  capitalization, the  more expansive  credit supply.  The best banks 
presumably had no need to continue financing customers in financial distress but 
could take the losses without endangering their posted capital adequacy ratios. In 
contrast, the banks which were not so weak as to be closely constrained by either the 
regulators or the creditors, but which nevertheless could not take the pending losses 
without violating the capital adequacy constraint played for time by financing the 
customers with difficulties in debt service. 
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43 Appendix 1 
The exogeneity of deposit rates and deposit volumes 
The exogeneity of bank deposit rates and the growth rates of deposits are tested by 
estimating analoguous equations for the average deposit rate and the average deposit 
growth rates for the preiods 86-90 and 90-92 as for the loan equation. The results are 
reported in the Table AI:  1. Cross-sectional variation in both the deposit rate and the 
deposit growth rate cannot really well explained by the examined bank characteristics 
in the 1980s, the R2 's are.1O and .07, respectively. In contrast, in the 1990s both the 
deposit rates and the growth rates of bank deposits depend much more on bank 
characteristics. These conclusion remains the same if  the interest rate and the growth 
rate are considered annually. Thus treating these variables exogenous would not seem 
justified in the 1990s. 
A couple of  interesting observations can be made about the 1990s equations. Just 
as in the 1980, bank operation costs lowered the average deposit rate suggesting that 
investment in and the usage of an extensive branch network indeed allowed banks to 
collect  deposits  deposits  which  were  "cheap"  in  terms  of interest  costs.  The 
significance of the coefficient of the share of business loans presumably simply 
reflects the fact the that banks lending heavily to businesses also obtain higher shares 
of zero or low yielding demand deposits of the firms. Interestingly, the banks with a 
high  loan-deposit  ratio  at  the  end of 1990  payed  clearly  higher  deposit  rates 
subsequently while no such relationship existed in the 1980s. This suggests that such 
banks attempted to increase their deposit funding by price competition in the 1990s. 
This also seems to have been successful in a degree, as there is a significant positive 
effect of deposit rates on the deposit growth in the 1990. However, there is also a 
significant negative effect of non-performing assets on deposit growth, particularly 
in the case of the savings banks. This suggests that bank risk affected the banks' 
possibilities of obtaining deposit funding, while banks did not pay any risk premium 
on deposit funding. It is also noteworthy that large banks, ceteris paribus/lost deposits 
in 1991 and 1992. 
44 Table A1.1  Equations for the deposit rate RD and growth of 
deposits GD 
Dependent variable  RD (aver. 87-90)  RD (aver. 91-92)  GD9086  GD9290 
explanatory 
Variable  coef- I-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value 
ficient  ficient  ficient  ficient 
CONSTANT CB'S  .063  12.7***  .068  18.4***  1.69  15.1***  7.08  .84 
SB'S  .067  13.4***  .072  17.1***  .49  .03  -5.56  -.59 
KlA86  -.00  -.47  -.50  -.73 
CORRAT90  .00  .11  .09  .60 
COST  -.18  -2.60***  - .15  -4.02***  4.43  2.41 **  -.25  -.40 
CGLOSS91  .00  .92  -.38  -1.26 
NPA91  CB'S  .00  .34  -.18  -1.99** 
SB'S  .00  .21  -.61  -4.39*** 
BUSSHA  CB'S  -7.1e-5  -2.80***  -.11  -2.56** 
SB'S  -8.2e-5  -1.57  .07  .77 
DINC  .003  .79  -.001  -.39  41.3  4.99***  6.71  1.48 
DUNR  -.000  -.15  .000  1.28  .39  .78  -.69  -3.32*** 
CONSER  -.006  -1.43  -.002  -.88  1.55  .15  .99  .20 
URPOP  -.002  -.67  .003  1.56  4.85  .81  -1.71  -.60 
CPO  -.002  -2.38**  .000  .08  1.32  .59  .60  .57 
UD  -.002  -.79  .008  5.03***  25.8  4.08***  4.76  1.73* 
SIZE  .00068  1.79*  -.00  -.00  .36  .36  -2.63  -5.31 *** 
RD (over 87-90)  1.28  .97  3.74  4.37*** 
ADJ. R2  .Q7  .31  .10  .35 
45 Appendix 2 
The LAD regression and excluded observations 
Table A2.1  The lad results 
CORRAT92*  BISRAT92*  DBARAT92* 
Variable  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  t-value 
CONSTANT  CB'S  35.5  7.20***  33.7  6.72***  38.5  7.72*** 
SB'S  19.6  16.3  22.3 
CAP  -.54  -4.55***  -.30  -2.75***  -.33  -4.20*** 
GOV.CAP  .49  1.09  .71  1.57  .43  .94 
COST  -.99  -2.69**  -.89  -2.40**  -1.05  -2.84*** 
CGLOSS91  -.13  -.59  -.10  -.44  -.13  -.57 
NPA91  CB'S  -.02  -.26  -.06  -.96  -.03  -.49 
SB'S  -.54  -.51  -.53 
BUSSHA  CB'S  -.17  -5.72***  -.17  -5.59***  -.18  -5.92*** 
SB'S  .02  .02  -.01 
DINC  .65  .19  -.68  -.20  -.88  -.26 
DUNR  -.20  -1.39  -.30  -2.01 **  -.31  -2.06** 
CONS ER  1.53  .89  2.89  1.66*  3.11  1.80* 
URPOP  .22  .09  1.39  .62  .69  .31 
CPO  -1.49  -1.98*  -1.73  -2.26**  -1.88  -2.46** 
LID  -3.94  -2.62**  -3.79  -2.55**  -5.13  -3.44*** 
SIZE  -1.71  -4.89***  -1.68  -4.77***  -1.76  -4.99*** 
CLOSSG  -.73  -1.73*  -.82  -1.93*  -.65  -l.53 
ADJ.R2  .43  .43  .44 
N  388  388  3.88 
TESTS: Significance levels 
CAP & COST  .00  .03  .00 
CGL&NPA 
CB'S  .52  .38  .46 
SB'S  .00  .00  .00 
CGL & NPA &  CB'S  .00  .00  .00 
BUS  SB'S  .00  .00  .00 
DEMAND  .48  .32  .25 
46 Table A2.2  Characteristics of the outliers 
Outliers  Total sample 
Average  N=lO  N=395 
GL9290  32.7  4.7 
BISRAT90  9.9  8.6 
CGLOSS91  0.09  0.53 
NPA91  4.4  8.2 
LID90  .86  1.04 
ASSETS, millions of FIM  106.5  567.4 
47 Appendix 3 
Further Regression Results 



























coefficient  t-value 
excl. outliers 
19.8  6.27*** 
16.1  4.55*** 
-.25  -2.95*** 
.69  2.13** 
-.51  -1.39 
-.02  -.17 
-.02  -.47 
-.34  -4.88*** 
-.12  -5.47*** 
-.11  -2.39** 
2.23  .91 
-.33  -2.22** 
.56  .35 
-2.53  -1.88* 
-1.36  -2.58** 
-1.46  -1.00 
-1.01  -3.88*** 




TESTS: Significance levels 
CAP & COST  .00 
CGL&NPA 
CB'S  .87 
SB'S  .00 
CGL& NPA&  CB'S  .00 
BUS  SB'S  .00 
DEMAND  .04 
48 
CAP =  BISRAT92* 
coefficient  t-value 
20.1  5.97*** 
15.4  4.27*** 
-.17  -2.01 ** 
.58  1.79* 
-.64  -1.71 * 
-.00  -.00 
-.04  -.78 
-.34  -4.93*** 
-.12  -5.69*** 
-.10  -2.35** 
1.97  .80 
-.42  -2.33** 
.69  .42 
-2.46  -1.83* 
-1.17  -2.24** 
-1.12  .78 
-.90  -3.43*** 










CAP =  DBARAT92* 
coefficient  t-value 
16.9  4.93*** 
12.9  3.65*** 
-.05  -.78 
.67  2.02** 
-.38  -1.04 
-.03  -.17 
-.05  -1.16 
-.33  -4.78*** 
-.10  -4.82*** 
-.10  -2.28** 
1.55  .64 
- .41  -2.33** 
.62  .39 
-1.67  -1.25 
-1.31  -2.54** 
.68  .48 
-1.05  -4.09*** 









.09 Table A3.2  1992 IV estimates for weak and strong banks 
BISLOW  BISHIGH  NPAHIGH  NPALOW 
Variable  coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value  coef- t-value 
ficient  ficient  ficient  ficient 
CONSTANT  CB'S  23.1  5.41 ***  23.9  5.47***  21.0  4.82***  21.8  4.09*** 
SB'S  18.6  3.17***  15.6  3.24***  15.9  3.20***  16.3  2.94*** 
CAP: CORRAT  -.10  -.33  -.41  -3.11***  -.19  -1.66*  -.37  -2.47** 
GOV. CAP  .75  1.34  .43  1.03  .31  .78  .99  1.71* 
COST  -1.50  -2.20**  -.72  -1.59  -.65  -1.35  -.62  -1.04 
CGLOSS91  -.21  -.87  .12  .65  .00  .07  -.10  -.13 
NPA91  CB'S  -.05  -.64  -.05  -.80  -.10  -1.49  .01  .05 
SB'S  -.30  -3.57***  -.09  -.71  -.37  -4.12***  -.18  -.44 
BUSSHA  CB'S  -.07  -1.66*  -.15  -5.75***  -.09  -3.08***  -.14  -4.29*** 
SB'S  -.09  -1.46  -.07  -1.03  -.06  -1.06  -.11  -1.50 
DINC  3.78  .98  1.43  .45  1.28  .51  4.55  .64 
DUNR  -.39  -1.23  -.47  -2.23**  -.46  -2.00**  -.31  -1.09 
CONSER  3.31  1.67*  -1.91  -.73  2.88  1.09  .78  .35 
URPOP  -5.00  -2.20**  .80  -.47  -4.67  -2.52**  -2.09  -1.01 
CPO  -1.66  -1.72*  1.18  -1.90*  -1.62  -2.11**  -1.11  -1.46 
LID  -5.28  -2.20**  .62  .34  -3.43  -1.92*  .44  .18 
SIZE  -.28  -.63  -1.35  -4.06***  -.58  -1.75*  -1.62  -3.27*** 
CLOSSG  -1.62  -3.14***  -.97  -1.84*  -.90  -2.35**  -1.84  -2.05** 
ADJ. R2  .67  .29  .55  .25 
N  124  257  195  186 
TESTS: Significance levels 
CAP & COST  .09  .00  .15  .04 
CGL& NPA  CB'S  .51  .63  .32  .99 
SB'S  .00  .63  .00  .89 
CGL&NPA  CB'S  .17  .00  .00  .00 
&BUS  SB'S  .00  .63  .00  .50 
DEMAND  .09  .15  .04  .52 
49 Table A3.3  1992 IV estimates for savings banks and cooperative 
banks 
SAVINGS  COOPERATIVE 
BANKS  BANKS 
coef- t-value  coef- t-value 
ficient  ficient 
CONSTANT  11.9  2.07*  21.9  5.82*** 
CAP  -.13  -.64  -AI  -4.13*** 
GOV.CAP  1.60  1.79*  .00  .00 
COST  -.16  -.22  -.91  -2.16** 
CGLOSS91  -.96  -2.56**  .19  1.22 
NPA91  -.13  -1.61  -.05  -.99 
BUSSHA  -.04  -.86  -.12  -5.71*** 
DINC  2049  .59  2.35  .82 
DUNR  -.11  .27  -.54  -2.78*** 
CONSER  -1.63  -.52  1.61  .88 
URPOP  -3.64  -1.14  -2.08  -1043 
CPO  -.38  -.23  -1.12  -2.07** 
LID  -6.02  -2.05**  .12  .07 
SIZE  -.34  -.66  -.87  -2.67*** 
CLOSSG  -.96  -.84  -1.62  -4.24*** 
ADJ. R2  .55  .22 
N  79  302 
TESTS: Significance levels 
CAP & COST  .79  .00 
CGL&NPA  .00  .35 
CGL & NPA & BUS  .00  .00 
DEMAND  .55  .03 
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